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Abstract
Additively homomorphic encryption is a public-key primitive allowing a sum to be computed
on encrypted values. Although limited in functionality, additive schemes have been an essen-
tial tool in the private function evaluation toolbox for decades. They are typically faster and
more straightforward to implement relative to their fully homomorphic counterparts, and more
efficient than garbled circuits in certain applications. This thesis presents a novel method for
extending the functionality of additively homomorphic encryption to allow the private evalua-
tion of functions of restricted domain. Provided the encrypted sum falls within the restricted
domain, the function can be homomorphically evaluated “for free” in a single public-key oper-
ation. We will describe an algorithm for encoding private functions into the public-keys of two
well-known additive cryptosystems.
We extend this scheme to an application in the field of pharmacogenomics called Similar
Patient Query. With the advent of human genome project, there is a tremendous availability
of genomic data opening the door for a possibility of many advances in the field of medicine.
Precision medicine is one such application where a patient is administered drugs based on their
genetic makeup. If the genomic data is not kept private, it can lead to several information
frauds, so it needs to be encrypted. To tap the full potential of the encrypted genomic data,
we need to perform computations on it without compromising its security. For SPQ, we pick
a query genome and compare it across a hospital data base, to find patients similar to that of
the query and use the information to apply precision medicine, all of this is carried out under
privacy preserving settings in the presence of a semi-honest adversary in a single transaction.
Keywords: Secure Function Evaluation, Public Key Cryptosystem, Homomorphic En-
cryption, Prime Number Generation, Genomic Data, Secure Genomic Computations, Similar
Patient Query
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Summary For Lay Audience
In an increasingly data driven world, information availability and its distribution are explod-
ing exponentially. The access to personal information has also invited a lot of threats such as
hacking, denial of service attacks, injecting malicious code or gaining illegal access to con-
fidential information. As these threats are becoming a matter-of-course with ever increasing
sophistication- planning, implementing and maintaining information security systems at any
organization is becoming a challenging task. There are a lot of systems in place to protect data
at various levels such as physical, application, network and cloud. There are also myriad legal
regulations and compliances that help the organizations to improve their security strategy by
providing guidelines depending on the type of data these organizations are handling with. Vio-
lating these standards can result in severe penalties such as fines and law suits, or even worse,
personal information breach. The most challenging aspect of information security thus lies in
making the best possible use of available data while ensuring privacy.
One of the popular approaches of storing information securely is to encrypt it or convert it
into random looking numbers so when hackers have access to it, they will not be able to figure
out what the data is about. Now, it is hard to perform computations on this random looking
numbers. If we need to make use of the full potential of the data, we need to decode those
random looking numbers. Nonetheless, there are methods in the field of computer science and
pure math that enable us to perform analysis without breaking this data. To make the best
use of data in an encrypted form, we use concepts from math and design functions in such a
way that, we can perform computations on the encrypted data without having to decode. Our
thesis presents one of such algorithms which help us perform computations without decoding
the data. Once we perform computations and decode this data, we get the results in the same
way as if we would get if the computations on plain text data.
We use these algorithms for applications in the field of medicine to conduct search across
genomic data bases. Genomic databases are stored in a secure way to avoid leaking any sensi-
tive information. Using our algorithms, we can search across these databases without decoding
the data. We perform some mathematical functions and retrieve similarity scores and obtain
similar records to that of our search query. This is used in the field of precision medicine
where, we administer medication or therapy to a patient based on their genetic make up. Since
iii
not all databases are available openly, the medical practitioners cannot tap the full potential of
genomic data. Using our algorithm, we help the medical practitioners to access across all the
databases even if encrypted, giving them tremendous potential to make advances in the field of
precision medicine.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In an increasingly data-driven world, information availability and its distribution are surging
exponentially. The access to personal information has also invited a lot of threats such as hack-
ing, denial of service attack, injecting malicious code, or gaining illegal access to confidential
information. These threats are becoming a matter-of-course with ever-increasing sophistica-
tion due to which planning, implementing, and maintaining information security systems at
any organization is becoming a challenging task. There are many systems in place to protect
data at various levels like physical, application, network, and cloud. The myriad legal regula-
tions and compliances help the organizations to improve their security strategy by providing
guidelines depending on the type of data these organizations are handling. Violating these
standards can result in severe penalties such as fines and lawsuits, or even worse, personal in-
formation breach. The most challenging aspect of information security thus lies in making the
best possible use of available data while ensuring privacy.
The basic components of information security are often abbreviated as the CIA triad[22],
which can be described as:
• Confidentiality of data is achieved only when the people who are authorized to access
the data can do so.
• Integrity is the maintenance of data in its original state without modifying it uninten-
tionally or maliciously.
• Availability is just a mirror image of Confidentiality, as confidentiality aims to hide
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the message from unauthorized users, availability property ensures that the message is
available to the authorized users.
While ensuring these basic components, the information security is maintained in various ways
through physical, application and operational security. The most popular way of maintaining
data security is through Cryptography, where we perform data encryption. Encryption is the
method by which a message is converted into a secret code by hiding the original message.
With respect to a protocol that uses data encryption, the letter A in CIA triad will be defined
as Authenticity as opposed to availability. Authenticity means the ability to prove that the
message is coming from the original sender. Sticking to the goals of Confidentiality, Integrity
and Authenticity, data encryption is carried out by various cryptographic protocols, out of
which this thesis deals with asymmetric or public key encryption. In public key encryption,
we use mathematical concepts from number theory and convert the plain text message into
some random looking numbers. Many researches have been conducted to make the best use of
encrypted data without having to convert them to their original plain text format.
1.1 Motivation
The ability to perform computations on encrypted data has always been one of the most sought
after challenges in the field of cryptography. Private computations on data are becoming in-
creasingly significant as they have applications in many fields such as privacy preserving ma-
chine learning [54], private information retrieval [12], similarity search in private databases
such as genotype and other medical data [56], online voting [1], auctions [13] and private
credit checking [21]. The key idea behind secure computations is that two parties want to
evaluate some function on their encrypted inputs without leaking any information about their
input. When some special cases require privacy of the function to be evaluated, it is called
private function evaluation (PFE). Generally, when a PFE is carried out, the function will be
a private input of one of the parties and nothing can be leaked about this function to any ad-
versary that does not hold this function. In this thesis, we shall introduce a cryptosystem that
offers a novel approach for secure computations and we can use it for Private Function Evalua-
tion in some limited applications. Current methods used for secure and private function include
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Garbled Circuits Fully HE Partial HE
Speed Very Fast Slow Fast
Re-usability No Yes Yes
Round Complexity Constant Constant Constant
Communication Complexity Proportional to size of the circuit Independent Independent
Table 1.1: Performance Comparison of existing approaches for SFE and PFE
Garbled Circuits and homomorphic encryption schemes. We opted for Partial Homomorphic
Encryption (PHE) to solve the computations on encrypted data due to the several advantages it
offers over Garbled Circuits (GC) and Fully Homomorphic Encryption schemes (FHE). PHE
schemes are generally more efficient because they support only one type of operation: either
addition or multiplication. FHE usually allows us to do unbounded number of homomorphic
operations but it requires an expensive bootstrapping procedure. With respect to Garbled Cir-
cuits, the parties performing Secure or Private Function Evaluation need to interact many times
for a single transaction, which makes them unsuitable for applications that may require min-
imum communication. The table 1.1 summarizes the properties of PHE, FHE and GC. From
these properties, it can be established that Homomorphic Encryption has advantages of being
reusable for any input where as one GC can be used only for one garbled input. Also, the
communication complexity increases in GC with the increase in the depth of circuit function,
whereas HE scheme’s communication complexity remains independent. So despite the speed
advantage offered by GC, we opted for Secure Function Evaluation using HE. In Homomor-
phic Encryption, partial HE is faster and of low cost compared to full HE, which makes it an
ideal choice for Secure Function Evaluation.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis introduces a new framework where certain functions mapping Integer to Boolean co
domain can be privately evaluated. Imagine some organization developed a special algorithm
to identify a patient’s reaction to particular medicine based on their genetic make up. Owing
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to proprietary issues, the algorithm needs to be private. In special cases, some hospitals do
not want to disclose elaborate answers as it may leak sensitive genetic information, rather they
just want the parties to learn some Boolean answers such as “true” or “false”. This is one of
the several applications that the cryptosystem introduced through our research can be used for.
The contributions of the thesis include:
• A new private key-generation algorithm that helps in generation of prime numbers that
contain long, pre-defined sequences of Legendre symbols of integers modulo an odd,
large prime.
• A secure evaluation scheme based on these arbitrary patterns of Legendre symbols that
extends Additively Homomorphic Encryption schemes to privately evaluate functions
with Boolean co-domain.
• A protocol for applying this new scheme by proving that all the evaluations can be per-
formed freely and securely in a single public-key operation.
• Proof of security and hardness for the new scheme.
• Privacy proof for Secure Function Evaluation protocol in a two-party, honest but curious
adversary setting.
• An application based on the new cryptosystem for carrying out Similar Patient Query
using genomic data in a privacy preserving manner.
• Protocol for secure SPQ along with hardness proof, implementation, and results.
1.2.1 Black Box Methodology
The key generation protocol presented in this paper paves a way for a user to implement a
generic methodology to evaluate some functions in a restricted domain without leaking the
output or input. This can be extended across any public key cryptosystem that supports linear
homomorphic encryption operations. To be precise, our scheme can be used like a black box
across these cryptosystems - Okamoto Uchiyama, Paillier, Goldwasser-Micali, and DGK. All
these have different sets of security parameters with respect to public keys, but all of them
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encrypt the plain text messages by raising it to a generator g, which is one of the public key
parameters. Mathematically, cipher texts obtained are in the form gm, along with a hiding
factor that varies from scheme to scheme. All these schemes carry out operations in modulus
n which is a composite number formed as a multiple of two large primes, i.e., n = pq. Our
scheme presents a novel method to generate one of these large primes, p. p is used to eliminate
the hiding factor during decryption. We make use of simple properties from number theory
and helps us generate the prime factor p, which would in no way alter any of the encryption or
decryption steps of the aforementioned cryptosystems. But the special way of prime generation
would help us dive into a new dimension during decryption process where private function
evaluation can be carried out in restricted domains.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 covers background on basics of Secure Multiparty Computation, Secure
Function Evaluation, Private Function Evaluation and secure computation methods. It
goes on to introduce the idea behind existing public key cryptosystems along with an
introduction to Partial Homomorphic Encryption and describes homomorphisms under
these encryption schemes. The last section in this chapter gives the key idea behind the
cryptosystem.
• Chapter 3 talks about important mathematical preliminaries necessary for the cryptosys-
tem with some basic definitions and theorems necessary for prime number generation.
• Chapter 4 focuses on the cryptosystem that is built using the basics from linear func-
tional embeddings. For this, a special key generation algorithm will be provided, the
encryption and decryption schemes will be the same as a standard cryptosystem that we
would like to implement, i.e., either Okamoto-Uchiyama or Paillier.
• Chapter 5 has two parts. The first part discusses the necessary definitions and theorems
necessary to prove the security of our cryptosystem. Second part consists of security and
hardness proofs.
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• Chapter 6 presents the protocol for Secure Function Evaluation introduced in the chap-
ter 4. It also consists of correctness and hardness proofs for this protocol.
• Chapter 7 is about the privacy of the protocol. This chapter consists of definitions nec-
essary to prove protocol privacy and privacy proofs with respect to the parties involved
in the protocol transactions.
• Chapter 8 contains the application for the Secure Function Evaluation protocol intro-
duced in chapter 6. It throws light on details of carrying out Similar Patient Query under
privacy preserving settings. Then we introduce a new algorithm to compute Euclidean
Distance among genomic data under privacy preserving settings. Finally a protocol for
carrying out SPQ will be described.
• Chapter 9 discusses the implementation of our cryptosystem along with the SPQ appli-
cation. The first part introduces algorithms to find the best α, β for prime generation and
prime generation itself based on the required Legendre symbol sequences. The second
part of the chapter talks about the SPQ application. Implementation steps along with
results and analysis for both the processes is provided in this chapter.
• Chapter 10 is a conclusion chapter that presents discussion and scope for future work
on this thesis along with the concluding remarks.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we go through some basic concepts that are necessary to understand the cryp-
tosystem we developed. It also highlights the literature available in the area of secure multi-
party computation and its related topics. We deal with concepts of Secure Multiparty Computa-
tion where we give a generic overview of the concept and go on to explain about Secure Func-
tion Evaluation and Private Function Evaluation and the terms that can be used interchangeably
depending on the application. We then proceed to explain the existing SMC protocols which
include Yao- based protocols namely Garbled Circuits and Universal Circuits, and the pro-
tocols that are built tapping the mathematical properties of public key cryptosystems namely
Homomorphic encryption schemes. The scope of this thesis is limited to extending additively
homomorphic encryption schemes for secure function evaluation and hence the next sections
deal with the details of these schemes. To give a detailed understanding of how homomorphic
encryption can be used to carry out, we proceed the rest of the chapter with an explanation
on public key cryptosystems. Then we describe two probabilistic cryptosystems, Okamoto-
Uchiyama and Paillier cryptosystems in detail which can be used for applying our scheme. We
discuss the concept of homomorphism and give brief details of partial homomorphism that is
displayed by the probabilistic cryptosystems. Partial homomorphism is exhibited mainly in
case of addition, multiplication and scalar multiplication, so we explain how all of the three
operations work on encrypted data. The last section of this chapter introduces the backbone of
our research- Residues based homomorphic encryption scheme. Its basic idea will be discussed
along with the related work done in this aspect.
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2.1 Secure Multiparty Computation
The key idea behind secure multiparty computation, which we shall denote as MPC hereafter,
is that two or more parties collaborate on computing some agreed upon function on their private
inputs. None of the parties in this transaction are allowed to learn about others’ input and by
the end of the transaction only the output of the function is revealed. The security in a MPC
is established by considering a Real-Ideal paradigm. The main aim of cryptography is to build
protocols that secure in the presence of corrupt participants. So the ideal world setting is such
that a secure computation of some function F(x) is carried out by some trusted party T . The
inputs to these function are provided by multi parties Pi. The assumption in this ideal world
is that an adversary can manipulate anyone from Pi but not the trusted party T . This makes it
easier for us to understand security in an ideal world because an adversary learns no more than
F(x) from T . The real world notion is much more complex as there are no trusted parties. All
Pis communicate with each other using some protocol π. An MPC is secure if the π carrying
out the MPC in real world can provide security that is equivalent to that of ideal world.
2.1.1 Secure Function Evaluation
This is a process of calculating a function on inputs of multiple parties without sharing the
inputs of both the parties with each other. This started way back in the 1980s during when it was
used only for theoretical purposes [11]. The first problem was a secure two-party computation
that started with a millionaire’s problem introduced by Andrew Yao [69]. It was generalized
to more generic secure computations in [70] and practical applications were developed at a
later point in time. There is tremendous amount of research conducted in this field to lower
the time and computational complexity required for performing secure function evaluation
cryptographically. The more formal definition for secure function evaluation is explained in
the next paragraph. We first give the notion of secure function evaluation between two parties,
then extend the definition to SFE among multiple parties.
Secure Function Evaluation between two parties can be carried out as follows:
Each party holds inputs {X,Y} respectively. They want to evaluate a function f (X,Y) on their
inputs, without actually sharing their respective inputs with each other. Secure Function Eval-
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uation will be carried out in such a way that upon its completion both the users know F(X,Y)
and nothing about the inputs for X , Y .
Based on this definition, we give a more formal definition for secure function evaluation
that involves multiple number of users. Let n be the number of users, u be the number of
inputs possessed by each individual user. These users want jointly evaluate some function F :
{0, 1}un 7→ {0, 1}m. Each ith user possesses an xi ∈ {0, 1}u. Secure Function Evaluation will be
carried out in such a way that upon its completion all the n users will receive F(x1, x2, x3, ..., xn)
and nothing about the x j for j , i. Secure Function Evaluation can be carried out under
three adversary settings: Honest-but-curious, Malicious and dynamic. More formal notions
of these adversaries are discussed in chapter 6. The tools used for secure function evaluation are
discussed under secure computation methods. Mostly SFE is used interchangeably with secure
computation or private function evaluation. But there are some subtle differences between PFE
and SFE, which will become clearer with the upcoming sections.
2.1.2 Private Function Evaluation
As discussed earlier, Private Function Evaluation is a special case of Multiparty computation.
The difference between PFE and SFE is that in SFE, the function F need not be hidden and only
the respective inputs are hidden from each other, whereas in PFE, while the security constraints
of SFE are maintained, it also hides F. In [41] it was highlighted that, while the function to
be computed will be a private input of one of the parties in secure multiparty computation
process, the key security requirement is that the only information an adversary who does not
control F can learn is about the size of the circuit and nothing else about F. Here, size of
the circuit indicates the number of gates and distinct wires in the circuit. The circuits used in
Private Function Evaluation are called as Universal Circuits, and more details about these are
discussed in the next section. Formally, we can define Private Function Evaluation as:
Given n users, with u inputs, let an user p hold F : {0, 1}un 7→ {0, 1}m as one of their inputs.
PFE is carried out in such a way that upon completion users will only learn the outputs and no
information will be revealed about F and x j for j , i. Any adversary trying to control p cannot
learn anything about F other than its depth.
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2.1.3 Secure Computation Protocols
The two most popular approaches for secure multiparty computations are using Homomorphic
Encryption and Garbled circuits. Homomorphic Encryption often requires little interaction but
is computationally complex. Garbled Circuits make efficient use of symmetric key operations
but require multiple interactions between the two parties. Both the methods work by involving
a trade-off between communication and computational complexity. Some applications require
minimum communications between the parties involved, which is why they cannot rely on
Garbled Circuits. And for those operations that can be implemented using unbounded num-
ber of additions and scalar multiplications, Additively Homomorphic Cryptosystems are more
suitable than their Fully Homomorphic Counterparts as they are relatively fast and straight-
forward to implement. The upcoming subsections survey some of the secure computation
protocols. Any secure computation protocol can be viewed as a form of computation carried
out under encryption.
Garbled Circuits
These were initially proposed by Yao [69] for solving the Millionaire’s problem. We convert
the input function into a Boolean circuit, where each input into this circuit will be encrypted
by two separate keys. These encrypted values are then added to a truth table by randomly
permuting them- also known as ”garbling”. This truth table will be exchanged between the
parties using oblivious transfer, where in the sender transfers many pieces of information to the
receiver, but remains oblivious to what piece of information has been received. Then an eval-
uation will be applied to extract the output from the key information obtained in OT protocol.
There are many different types of garbled circuits available for secure function evaluation, but
Yao’s garbled circuit is a classical approach and rest of the garbled circuits such as point and
permute [6], free XOR [35], Garbled row reductions [43] [52], fleXOR [34], half gates [72],
and garbled gadgets [5] are optimizations to Yao’s circuit. Whatever the scheme may, the
functionality remains constant with following steps:
• A garbling step, where a security parameter is provided, along with the function that
needs to be evaluated and returns a garbled circuit as an output along with information
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about encoding and decoding. This garbled circuit, encoding and decoding information
will be used in the upcoming steps.
• Encoding information will be used to garble an input.
• Garbled circuit will take the garbled input and returns a garbled output. This step is
called evaluation.
• The final step would be where decoding information will be used to decode the garbled
output to plain text output.
Homomorphic Encryption
Apart from garbled circuits, Homomorphic encryption is another type of protocol which is used
to carry out secure computations under private settings. Homomorphic encryption is a form of
encryption that allows a user to perform computations on encrypted data. The result of homo-
morphic encryption will be another encrypted text which when decrypted will match results of
operations as if they were carried out on plain text. Homomorphic encryption schemes allowed
for a wide range of applications that require privacy preserving computations such as outsourc-
ing cloud storage and predictive analytics on encrypted data to name a few. A lot of secure
function evaluation schemes have been proposed by [26] [66] [51] [37] [17] [9] which deal
with homomorphic encryption scheme. Broadly, there are two types of HE schemes namely
partial HE and fully HE, which will be discussed briefly in the next sections.
Partial Homomorphic Encryption
The rest of our thesis will deal with the cryptosystem based on Partial Homomorphic Encryp-
tion scheme. So, this section will highlight some generic aspects with existing literature in
PHE that deals with secure function evaluation. The technical aspects of PHE are discussed
through various sections across this thesis. A PHE based scheme usually performs limited
mathematical operations on encrypted data, which is why we use PHE for some linear Secure
Function Evaluation protocols that mostly rely on either simple Addition or multiplication. It
is difficult to carry out multiple operations using a simple PHE scheme, which is why they
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have less computational complexity. [51] [37] and [17] tried to extend simple PHE schemes
to support multiple operations such as addition, multiplication, exponentiation and natural log.
Nonetheless, a variety of health care data analytics which do not have too many computations
or rely only on linear operations like additions and scalar multiplications, have a tremendous
amount of potential in resorting to partial homomorphic encryption schemes.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Since PHE has a potential to perform limited number of computations on encrypted data, re-
searches were conducted to explore the possibilities of performing multiple computations on
encrypted data. It began with [25] developing a HE scheme using lattice based cryptography.
Later, several schemes were introduced to carry on complex operations like multiplication and
other complex arithmetic circuit operations. Though there are many sub-types in case of HE
schemes, we just broadly consider them as partial or full depending on the linearity of the com-
putations the schemes perform. Nonetheless, Fully homomorphic encryption is the strongest
notion of homomorphic encryption there is, as it is supposed to allow unbounded number of
arithmetic circuit operations. This way, secure function evaluation can be carried out in an easy
way with FHE. But the computational complexity is too high for FHE, making PHE a more
suitable option for real time applications.
Universal Circuits
These are a special type of arithmetic circuits specifically dealing with Private Function Eval-
uation. Since PFE involves hiding the function to be evaluated, generic SFE techniques may
become too simple for usage. Let there be two parties P1 and P2 such that P1 holds input x and
P2 holds a circuit that represents the function f that needs to be evaluated. From the definition
of PFE, we need the f to remain private. This implies that the circuit C f holding f , itself should
remain private. PFE stands in contrast to an SFE meaning that in SFE for inputs x, y, we take
an f which is agreed upon previously by the participants. Now we calculate f (x, y) using an
agreed upon C f without knowing the inputs. In case we need to hide this C f , we try to develop
some Universal Circuit Un with n gates such that U(C, x) = Cn(x). This notion of Universal
Circuits have been used in the literature by [36] [57] [49]. The implementations are tedious,
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error prone, and challenging when it comes to writing code for Universal Circuits. Certain op-
timizations have also been introduced in [33] [41], but the computational complexity is always
dependent on the depth of the circuit making it very complex for real time applications.
2.2 Public Key Cryptography
The idea of public key cryptography is to share secrets over a public network or platform. The
participants in a transaction done using public key cryptosystem have never met to exchange
the secret key. It uses a pair of keys: Public and Private, where the public key is distributed to
everyone trying to encrypt using the cryptosystem and private key is known solely to the owner.
The hardness of the breaking up a public key cryptosystem is based on the mathematical prob-
lems that help us to produce one-way. Basically we take up some hardness assumptions from
mathematics and use them to build public key cryptosystems that are hard to break using a poly-
nomial time algorithm. The most widely used hardness assumptions are Discrete Logarithm
problem [30], Quadratic Residuosity Problem introduced by [24] and applied by cryptosystems
like Goldwasser-Micali [27], Decisional composite residuosity assumption [48], higher Resid-
uosity Problem [73], and Integer Factorization problem [55]. Based on these hardness assump-
tions many public key cryptosystems were designed. To apply our scheme, we need the public
key schemes that support Additive Homomorphism, which include Goldwasser-Micali [27],
Paillier [48], Okamoto-Uchiyama [47], DGK [14], and Exponential ElGamal [19]. The scope
of this thesis is limited to applying Okamoto-Uchiyama and Paillier Cryptosystem for secure
function evaluation. A detailed description of these two cryptosystems is given in the coming
subsections. Any cryptosystem usually contains three parts: a key generation algorithm, an
encryption step, and a decryption step. Our description for all the cryptosystems in this thesis
follow the same steps. Also, we use M as a message space of size Zk, where k denotes the
number of bits of prime p. One of the greatest advantages in using these cryptosystems is that
both of them are probabilistic. When we say a scheme is probabilistic, it indicates that each
message encrypts into different cipher text. In fact, same message is encrypted into different
cipher text each time as we encrypt due to the presence of a random factor. This makes these
cryptosystems suitable for limited message spaces like {0, 1}n or {0, 1, 2}, as we may need to
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encrypt the same number multiple times. If we use a non-probabilistic cryptosystem like RSA
to encrypt these message spaces, an attacker can easily figure out the plain text messages by
using the cipher text that is published.
Before proceeding further we would like to give some basic definitions that are necessary
to understand the cryptosystems we are going to discuss next.
Group A group is an algebraic structure that has two components- set of elements G and a
binary operator (∗). These groups display the following properties:
• Closure Property: ∀a, b ∈ G, (a ∗ b) ∈ G
• Associative Property: ∀a, b, c ∈ G, (a ∗ b) ∗ c = a ∗ (b ∗ c)
• Identity Property: ∃i ∈ G | ∀a ∈ G, (i ∗ a) = a, where i is identity element
• Existence of Inverse: ∀a ∈ G,∃b ∈ G | a ∗ b = i, where i is the identity element
• Some groups called Abelian Groups have a property called Commutative Property which
ensures that ∀a, b ∈ G, a ∗ b = b ∗ a
Cyclic Group A cyclic group is an abelian group that can be generated from a single ele-
ment. These elements are called generators of the group and form the backbone of public
key cryptography. For example, if G is a cyclic group with some generator g, this implies
that every element in G is equal to gk for some k ∈ Z. For groups with finite order n we can
have k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., n − 1}, in these cases we can have more than one generators. These
generators form the base of the probabilistic cryptosystems which perform encryption using
exponentiation of plain text message.
2.2.1 Okamoto-Uchiyama Cryptosystem
Developed by Tatsuaki Okamoto and Shigenori Uchiyama in 1998 [47], this cryptosystem de-
pends on the hardness assumption called p-subgroup assumption which is discussed later in
chapter 5. We tried to apply our secure function evaluation protocol for the case of Okamoto-
Uchiyama cryptosystem. It works for integers in the multiplicative subgroup of integers
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(mod n). The decryption of this cryptosystem relies on the group homomorphism of the type:
L : Γ 7→ Zp which is given by L(xp + 1) = x, which can be re written as L(x) =
x − 1
p
.
Encryption
The encryption and decryption functions are implemented same way as described in [47]. For
a plain text message m ∈ M, public key PK = {n, g, h} where:
• n = p2q, (p, q are two large primes)
• Select a g ∈ Z∗n and g
p−1 . 1 (mod p2).
• This implies the encryption base B = {g ∈ Z∗n | ordp2(g (mod p
2))p−1 = p}.
• [47] proves that if g
R
←− Z∗n, then g ∈ B with overwhelming probability.
• h ≡ gn (mod n).
We generate a ciphertext C by applying the Encryption function Enc(M, PK) = C
c ≡ gmhr (mod n).
Decryption
To decrypt a ciphertext C we use the private keys S K = {p, q}. We compute:
a = L(cp−1 (mod p2)) =
(cp−1 (mod p2)) − 1
p
.
b = L(gp−1 (mod p2)) =
(gp−1 (mod p2)) − 1
p
.
Using Extended Euclidean algorithm we compute:
b
′
= b−1 (mod p).
Finally giving:
m = ab
′
(mod p).
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2.2.2 Paillier Cryptosystem
This cryptosystem considers n = pq where p, q are large primes ∈ Zk. It was developed
by Pascal Paillier in 1999 and relied on the hardness assumption that computing nth residue
classes is computationally difficult. As described in [48], this probabilistic public key scheme
displays additive homomorphism.
Encryption
Public key = n, g where:
• n = pq.
• select some g ∈ Z∗n2
This gives: c ≡ gmrn (mod n2).
Decryption
The private (decryption) keys are λ and µ where
λ = LCM(p − 1, q − 1).
µ = (L(gλ (mod n2)))−1 (mod n).
m = L(cλ (mod n2)).µ (mod n).
where L is a function of the form L(x) =
x − 1
n
In other words, consider two groups G and H:
G = {x = gmhr (mod n) for m ∈ Zp and h ∈ Zn}.
H = {x = hn (mod n) for y ∈ G}.
The p-subgroup problem is to distinguish elements of H from elements of G\H.
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2.3 Partial Homomorphic Encryption
Of all the secure computation methods discussed in section 2.1, we decided to develop a cryp-
tosystem based on Partial Homomorphic Encryption properties keeping in mind the time and
computational complexities. As discussed earlier, PHE encompasses evaluation of a single
type of computation: either addition or multiplication. Additionally, we can also perform scalar
multiplication along with addition in some cryptosystems that use a generator g and raise the
plain text m to g to form a cipher-text. The method to carry out addition and multiplication in
these type of cryptosystems is discussed in the following sections.
2.3.1 Addition
Additive homomorphism is displayed by the cryptosystems that generate cipher text of the
form c = gm. This is the case with cryptosystems discussed in the previous sections namely,
Paillier, Okamoto-Uchiyama, DGK, and exponential El-Gamal. Let n, g be public keys and
m1, m2 be plain text messages1, then additive homomorphism can be expressed as follows:
Enc(m1) · Enc(m2) = gm1gm2 (mod n)
= gm1+m2 (mod n)
= Encm1 + m2).
Goldwasser-Micali
Given n, a, m, r, where
(a
n
)
is a quadratic non-residue, r
R
←− Zn and m ← {0, 1}, Enc(b) =
amr2 (mod n). The addition in this cryptosystem results in a XOR function, i.e., an addition
(mod 2). Mathematically:
Enc(m1) · Enc(m2) = am1 · am2 · r21 · r
2
2 (mod n)
= a(m1+m2) · (r1 · r2)2 (mod n)
= Enc(m1 ⊕ m2).
1for the ease of explanation, we are using the common expressions from the cryptosystems by avoiding the
hider h and randomizer r
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2.3.2 Scalar Multiplication
For the same settings as discussed above, let k be some constant, then homomorphism for
scalar multiplication can be expressed as follows:
Enc((m)k) = (gm)k (mod n)
= (g)mk (mod n)
= Enc(km).
2.3.3 Multiplication
Multiplicative homomorphism is displayed by the cryptosystems which produce c = gm. In
this case, multiplication between encrypted m1 should be carried out like scalar multiplication
by raising the cipher-text to plain text m2. A different set of cryptosystems where we do not
use exponentiation to obtain cipher text, specifically whose security dependent on the hardness
of Discrete Logarithm Problem [30] can perform multiplication on two cipher texts. These are
unpadded RSA and El-gamal. Multiplication for exponentiation based cryptosystem can be
expressed as follows:
Enc(m1)(m2) = (gm1)m2 (mod n)
= gm1m2 (mod n)
= Enc(m1 · m2).
Unpadded RSA
Recall the basic RSA cryptosystem where, n is the public key modulus, e is the exponent
and Enc(m) = me (mod n). The homomorphism in this cryptosystem can be expressed for
messages m1,m2 as:
Enc(m1).Enc(m2) = (m1)e · (m2)e (mod n)
= (m1 · m2)e (mod n)
= Enc(m1 · m2).
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ElGamal
This cryptosystem, proposed in [19], uses a generator g, h = gx such that x is the secret key,
for some random number r ∈ ordg the cipher text is formed as Enc(m) = (gr,m.hr). For this,
the multiplicative homomorphism is calculated as:
Enc(m1).Enc(m2) = (gr1 ,m1hr1)(gr2 ,m2.hr2)
= (gr1+r2 , (m1 · m2)hr1+r2)
= Enc(m1 · m2).
2.4 Residues Based Homomorphic Evaluation
The homomorphism presented in this thesis is based on an Evaluation Function which is dis-
cussed later in section 4.3, where we evaluate the functions of the form Z 7→ {0, 1}`. The basic
idea for this cryptosystem is derived from [20]. Identifying patterns in the runs of consecutive
Quadratic Residues and Non residues (mod p) has always intrigued number theorists. If we
consider Legendre Symbols of a sequence of numbers of the form {x, x + 1, x + 2, ..., x + n}
(mod p), the pattern looks very random. In [20] an interesting pattern was identified with re-
spect to distribution of quadratic residues. They seem to imitate threshold functions which are
of the form:
T (x) =

1 if x > threshold
0 Otherwise.
Let QRp(x) be a function representing Quadratic Residuosity of an integer x ∈ Z. It can be
defined as:
QRp(x) =

1 if x is a quadratic residue mod p
0 Otherwise.
Combining both, the threshold function can be privately evaluated during decryption as fol-
lows:
QRp(x + f ) = T (x).
The limitation with the above idea is that, a search based approach should be used in identifying
the required patterns for Legendre Symbols (mod p). In other words, the domain for the
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function to be evaluated will be taken, say the domain is f (x) = {1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0}. This f(x) will
be used to search for same length of Residues and Non-residues iteratively across a range of
prime numbers, because remember a Residue (mod p) = 1 and Non-Residue (mod p) = 0.
This search based approach is difficult as the search needs to be carried out iteratively across
each prime ∈ P until the required pattern is found. This would become very difficult to find
larger runs of consecutive Residues and Non-Residues in the polynomial time as the domain
size of the function increases.
Many researches [68] [50] [31] [16] [8] [7] have been conducted in identifying patterns in
consecutive runs of Quadratic Residues. Although these studies were able to establish certain
bounds on the length of the sequences found, they only deal with consecutive residues or non
residues, but not arbitrary patterns where we can expect a combination of both residues and
non-residues. In fact, it is this randomness in occurrence of R and N is what makes it useful
for a wide range of applications in cryptography.
Our idea is that, instead of looking for arbitrary patterns in consecutive set of Rs and Ns,
we can go for numbers (mod p) by taking a random step size or go for arithmetic sequences
of fixed form. This may help us to find out the prime that has required patterns in Rs and
Ns. As opposed to applying a search across infinitely many numbers, it is easier to pick a
sequence and use the sequence to generate the necessary primes. This helped us in building a
new cryptosystem altogether, which can now be extended to privately evaluate functions with
a domain size up to 512 − bits. The functions that can be evaluated privately using this special
type of cryptosystems are of the following form:
f : Z+ 7→ {0, 1}`
Every function has an input set and target set. We define this input set as Domain. The function
performs certain operations on the input set, which produce the output that belongs to the
target set. The target set is known as co-domain. In the current scenario, we are looking
at functions whose domain X falls in a set of sequence of integers that can be expressed as
(αi + β) | α, β ∈ Z, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n}. The co-domain f (x) belongs to the message space of
{0, 1}n. The Boolean Function is chosen as co-domain because, the Legendre Symbols symbols
as defined above merely represent Boolean values indicating whether the given number is a
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quadratic residue (mod p) or not. Finding the apt α, β forms the heart of our scheme because,
these values determine the start of the required sequence of Quadratic Residues.
Chapter 3
Mathematical Preliminaries
This chapter deals with some definitions, mathematical basics required to discuss our cryp-
tosystem used for Secure and Private Function Evaluation. The definitions in the first section
will help us understand the type of functions that we are going to deal with for function evalu-
ation under privacy preserving settings. These definitions will be used to prove two theorems
that are the basic foundation for the key generation described in section 4.1. The theorems
stated are presented along with their proofs built using basics from number theory. We use the
same notations for the functions and other elements used in PFE throughout the thesis. For
example β denotes the beginning of the sequence used for prime generation and α is the step
size of the sequence.
3.1 Basic Definitions
Before proceeding with basic definitions, please note that the function g discussed in the fol-
lowing sections is different from the generator g ∈ Zn that used for encryption. The generator
g is an integer which will be used as a base for encryption of plain-text messages. Where as
function g : Z 7→ {0, 1} denotes a linear embedding function upon which we carry out our
secure function evaluation.
Quadratic Residues A number n ∈ Zp is called a Quadratic Residue mod p, where p is an odd
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prime ⇐⇒ there exists some x such that:
n ≡ x2 (mod p).
Otherwise n is a non-residue.
Properties of Quadratic Residues Quadratic Residues (QR) and Non-Residues (NR) have
the following properties:
QR · NR = NR
QR · NR = QR
NR · NR = QR.
Legendre Symbol The Legendre symbol is a function of a and p and is defined as:
(
a
p
)
≡

1 if a is quadratic residue (mod p)
−1 if a is quadratic non residue (mod p)
0 if a ≡ 0 (mod p).
Relatively Prime Integers Two integers are said to be relatively prime to each other or Co-
prime integers if they do not have a common factor other than 1. Mathematically, let a, b ∈ Z |
a , 0, b , 0, then a, b are co-prime ⇐⇒ gcd(a, b) = 1. As a corollary, every distinct pair of
prime numbers are relatively prime to one another.
Chinese Remainder Theorem Let p1, p2 be pairwise co-prime. Then the system of equa-
tions:
a ≡ b1 (mod p1)
a ≡ b2 (mod p2)
has a solution in a.
Quadratic Reciprocity Law The Quadratic Reciprocity Law states that:
(
a
p
)
≡

( p
a
)
if a or p ≡ 1 (mod 4)
−
( p
a
)
if a, p ≡ 3 (mod 4).
(3.1)
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Euler’s Criterion For an odd prime p and an integer a ∈ {1, p − 1}:
a
p−1
2 ≡

1 if a is quadratic residue (mod p)
−1 if a is quadratic non residue (mod p).
Function A function is rule established between two sets such that it assigns each element of
the first set to exactly one element in the second set. These two sets are also otherwise known
as input and target sets respectively. Consider two sets X, Y such that:
f : X → Y
From the above, we can define the input set X as domain and the target set Y as co-domain.
Functional Embedding Let f : Z∗p → {0, 1} and g : Zk → {0, 1} with k ≤ p. We say function
g is embedded in a function f if there exists a domain mapping function h : Zk → Z∗p such that
for all i ∈ Zk,
f
(
h(i)
)
= g(i).
Linear Embedding We say function g is linearly embedded in the function f if the domain
mapping function h is linear i.e., there exists an α, β such that,
f (αi + β) = g(i).
Dirichlet’s theorem Also known as Dirichlet’s prime number theorem, this theorem states
that for any two positive integers a, d that are co-prime, there exist infinitely many primes of
the form ka + d, where k is a positive integer. Simply put, there are infinitely many primes that
are congruent to a (mod d).
3.2 Linear Embeddings in Residue Symbol Sequences
The central idea of our method is to find linear embeddings of Boolean functions using the
sequence of Legendre symbols modulo a prime p. Let g : Zk → {0, 1} be a Boolean function.
Let f : Z∗p → {0, 1} be the Legendre symbol of an integer 0 < x < p mapped to the Boolean
domain, i.e.,
f (x) =
(
i
p
)
+ 1
2
.
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Finally, let the linear domain mapping function h : Zk → Zp be defined as
h(i) = αi + β.
for some prime p and 0 < α, β < p such that
f
(
h(i)
)
= g(i).
Using this approach we can implement Boolean function g as a linear embedding within the
sequence of Legendre symbols modulo prime p. With the following two theorems we prove
that such a p, α and β exist for all Boolean functions g.
3.2.1 A new technique for Prime Number Generation
Theorem 3.2.1 Consider a list of k distinct primes {a1, . . . , ak} and a list of residue symbols
{`1, . . . , `k} where `i ∈ {−1, 1}. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there exists a prime p such that(
p
ai
)
= `i.
Proof The proof proceeds in two parts. In the first part, we prove the existence of some integer
p′ that satisfies these conditions. In the second part, we prove the existence of a p′ implies the
existence of a prime p with the same properties. For each `i and ai, pick some 0 < bi < ai such
that (
bi
ai
)
= `i.
A solution for all `i ∈ {−1, 1} is guaranteed to exist given there exist both (ai − 1)/2 quadratic
residues and non-residues modulo ai. Let p′ be defined by the following system of equations:
p′ ≡ b1 (mod a1)
...
≡ bk (mod ak)
Because each ai is prime, each 0 < bi < ai is to be co-prime to ai. Therefore a solution for p′
exists via the Chinese remainder theorem. Since(
bi
ai
)
= `i,
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and p′ ≡ bi (mod ai), then for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k we have(
p′
ai
)
= `i.
Now we show the existence of an integer p′ implies the existence of a prime p with the same
congruences. Let A =
∏
ai and p = kA + p′ for some integer k ≥ 0. Since p ≡ p′ (mod A),
and therefore p ≡ bi (mod ai), then (
p
ai
)
= `i.
Finally, since p′ is relatively prime to A, Dirichlet’s theorem guarantees there are infinitely
many primes of the form kA + p′.
Theorem 3.2.2 For all k > 0 and all functions g : Zk → {0, 1} there exists a prime p and two
integers 0 < α, β < p such that for all 0 ≤ i < k,(
αi + β
p
)
+ 1
2
= g(i).
Proof Let α, β, k be positive integers such that αi + β is prime for all 0 ≤ i < k. The existence
of such an α, β is guaranteed for all k > 0 by the theorem due to Green and Tao [28] which
proves the primes contain arbitrarily long arithmetic sequences, and, therefore, there exists an
α, β for all k > 0 such that αi + β is prime for all 0 ≤ i < k. Given such a linear sequence
of prime valued 1 (αi + β)’s, theorem 3.2.1 guarantees there exists a prime p such that for all
0 ≤ i < k, (
p
αi + β
)
= 2g(i) − 1.
Suppose there existed a p such that p ≡ 1 (mod 4). Then by the law of quadratic reciprocity,(
αi + β
p
)
=
(
p
αi + β
)
= 2g(i) − 1,
and therefore,
g(i) =
(
αi + β
p
)
+ 1
2
.
1Requiring all (αi+β) be prime is only done to facilitate the existence proof. In practice, Algorithm algorithm 2
can generates suitable primes p in the presence of composite (αi + β).
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In the alternate case where all such primes p were congruent to 3 (mod 4), Theorem 1 also
guarantees there exists a prime p such that
(
p
αi + β
)
=

2g(i) − 1 if αi + b ≡ 1 (mod 4)
1 − 2g(i) if αi + b ≡ 3 (mod 4).
For all αi + β ≡ 1 (mod 4), quadratic reciprocity again gives us(
αi + β
p
)
=
(
p
αi + β
)
= 2g(i) − 1.
Finally, for all αi + β ≡ 3 (mod 4),(
αi + β
p
)
= −
(
p
αi + β
)
= −(1 − 2g(i)) = 2g(i) − 1.
Therefore
g(i) =
(
αi + β
p
)
+ 1
2
(3.2)
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k.
Chapter 4
Our Cryptosystem
This chapter presents a public-key method for homomorphically evaluating functions of the
form f : Z→ g(i), where g(i) is a linear embedding found in f . Based on the fundamentals of
public key cryptosystem,let us define this cryptosystem as CS = {Gen,Enc,Dec}. The three
components indicate:
• Gen - Key generation algorithm
• Enc - Encryption function
• Dec - Decryption function
Apart from these three components, we add a fourth functionality to our cryptosystem and label
it as an evaluation function. This evaluation function enables us to successfully perform secure
function evaluation in a unique way upon decryption of the ciphertext. In some scenarios,
we do not need to read the components of the second party to perform the secure function
evaluation due to the presence of this unique evaluation function described in section 4.3.
4.1 Key Generation
This section describes the key generation algorithm which is developed using the mathematical
preliminaries presented in the chapter 3. We are trying to generate p, which is one of the large
prime factors of the composite modulus n | n = pq. p is also a private key used for decryption
28
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si Factors
31 31
1969 11 · 179
3907 3907
5845 5 · 7 · 167
7783 43 · 181
9721 9721
11659 89 · 131
13597 13597
15535 5 · 13 · 239
17473 101 · 173
19411 7 · 47 · 59
Table 4.1: First 10 elements in a sequence length of 512 with at least one unique factor for
α = 1938 and β = 31
in various public key cryptosystems, so once generated, this p remains a secret. Depending on
the length of g(i) to be evaluated, we pick the α, β values such that f (αi + β) = g(i).
• Two parties that want to securely evaluate some function of the form g : Z 7→ {0, 1}`
agree upon a fixed co-domain f (αm + β), such that for some plain text message m
R
←− Zk,
f (αm + β) 7→ g(m).
• Based on the length of the linear embedding g(m) which is required to evaluate f (m),
we generate an arithmetic sequence of numbers S such that, each si ∈ S has at-least one
unique factor, i.e., si−1 = p1 · p2 and si = p1 · p3 and so on. As we proceed through
the set of arithmetic sequences, each new element must have at-least one new factor.
So to evaluate a g(m) of length 10, we need a sequence of 10 elements with atleast one
unique factor. An example for the first 10 elements of such sequence along with their
factorizations is displayed in table 4.1.
• Now we find bi using theorem 3.2.1 to match our required sequence. In order for this to
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work, not only does ai need to have the matching symbols but the unutilized primes in
the sequence need to remain as QRs so they don’t affect the overall Legendre Symbol of
si. This is established from the properties described in section 3.1.
• Once we find bi, we recursively apply Chinese Remainder Theorem to until we find a
prime p which is guaranteed as per theorem 3.2.2.
• To get
(
ai
p
)
≡ `i (mod p), depending on section 3.1 we find primes of the form p ≡ 1
(mod 4). Detailed steps of key-generation algorithms are discussed in section 9.1.1
4.2 Encryption and Decryption
Encryption and decryption mostly follow the same procedure as outlined in Chapter 2.2.1.
We can use both Okamoto-Uchiyama and Paillier cryptosystems in case of encryption
scheme. Remember both of them have n, which is a product of two large primes as public
key modulus where, n = pq in case of Paillier and n = p2q in case of Okamoto-Uchiyama.
Once we generate p using the key generation algorithm Gen, we can apply it in these cryp-
tosystems and generate the required n. It does not affect the encryptions scheme on the whole.
Depending on the cryptosystem used to carryout the encryption function, decryption will
be carried out in the final step of the transaction. Both Paillier and Okamoto-Uchiyama cryp-
tosystem use p as private key for their decryption. As stated earlier, since p is common, this
makes our key generation scheme Gen suitable for both the cryptosystems without having to
modify too much while decrypting.
4.3 Evaluation Function
This function is used to homomorphically evaluate any Boolean function within the restricted
domain which will be pre-specified. It is defined as follows:
Eval(PK, c): Given ciphertext c = Enc(m) and random cipher text blinding factor rc ∈ Zk, α, β
from the prime generation algorithm, we compute
c
′
= Eval(c) = ((cα) · β)r
2
c .
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Since our scheme supports only scalar multiplication and homomorphic addition, we use plain-
text α and Enc(β) for computing the evaluation function.
4.3.1 Proof of Correctness
Theorem 4.3.1 For m ∈ Zk, Dec(Eval(c)) homomorphically evaluates m to g(m), where g(m)
is the linear embedding of a function that we are trying to evaluate such that g : Zk 7→ 0, 1`
Please note that the linear embedding g is different from the generator g used for encryption of
a plain text message.
Proof For Enc(β) = β′, expanding Eval(c) we have:
Eval(Enc(m)) = ((gmhr)α) · β′)r
2
c
= ((gm)α) · β′)r
2
c · (hr
′
)
= Enc((αm + β′) · r2c ).
Upon decryption and applying definition from section 3.2 we get:
Dec(c
′
) = (αm + β) · r2c ).
Recall from definitions 1,2 and 3 that
f (r2c ) =
(
r2c
p
)
+ 1
2
= 1.
Therefore applying the f -function to the decryption result we have
f ((αm + β) · r2c ) = g(m) · f (r
2
c )
= g(m).
Chapter 5
Security of our Cryptosystem
The security of any cryptosystem is often established by showing that breaking them is harder
than the mathematical problems which are generally considered difficult.This difficulty is gen-
erally proven using two notions: one-way encryption and semantic security. We establish these
notions by starting with some relevant definitions. If we assume the functions chapter 3 defined
in as problems, the following definitions indicate what problems are hard. For implementation
we used Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem, so the security proof of CS = GEN,ENC,DEC is
based on the semantic security of Okamoto-Uchiyama Cryptosystem. We define the necessary
terms for security proof using them we establish that Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem is se-
mantically secure and then prove that CS is also semantically secure by extension. The proof
of Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem security is based on the proof described in [47] and [32].
5.1 Basic Definitions
Negligible Function A function is negligible with respect to some k ∈ N if for all c ∈ N there
exists some M ∈ Z such that f (k) <
1
kc
whenever k > M
Intractable Function A function f : X 7→ Y is intractable with respect to x ∈ Xi if for all
algorithms A, when the inputs in {X j| j , i} are held fixed, the probability function
Px[A(x) ∈ P(x)].
is non-negligible with respect to x ∈ Xi
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One-way encryption It is the computational problem of computing a plain text message m
from public key parameters- n, g and the cipher text c = Enc(m). If inverting the encryption is
intractable, the encryption is called a one-way function.
Semantic Security For b = 0, 1, let E0 and E1 be two experiments; let m0, m1 be two plain
text messages and A be an adversary(algorithm) that is trying to break into the system. We
have a challenger who outputs m0 in E0 and m1 in E1. We define the advantage of adversary
outputting the same values for both the experiments as:
Adv[A, E] = |Pr[w0] − Pr[w1]| ∈ [0, 1]].
where wb defines that an experiment b returned 1.
Now, E is semantically secure if for all efficient adversaries, the Adv[A,E] is negligible, mean-
ing no efficient adversary can distinguish the encryption of m0 from encryption of m1.
Factoring Problem It is the problem of computing factors p and q of the composite modulus
n.
Sylow’s Theorems Let G be a finite group. Let p be a prime dividing |G| such that G = pkm
with k > 1 and p - m [23]
• First Theorem There is a subgroup H ⊆ G of order pk, it is called Sylow p-Subgroup.
• Second Theorem Any two Sylow p-Subgroups are conjugate, there is an element g ∈ G
such that g−1Hg = K.
• Third Sylow Theorem Let np be the number of Sylow p-Subgroups then:
– np | m
– np ≡ 1 (mod p)
– np = |G|/|NG(H)|, where H is a Sylow p-Subgroup and NG(H) denotes the normal-
izer of H, i.e., the largest subgroup of G in which H is normal.
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5.2 One-way Function
Theorem 5.2.1 If the factoring problem is intractable, then the encryption is a one-way func-
tion.
Proof The encryption function of this cryptosystem is same as that of Okamoto-Uchiyama
cryptosystem. The proof works out by verifying that the distribution of the ciphertext in the
cryptosystem can be simulated by an algorithm.We take two algorithms A1 and A2. A1 in-
verts the encryption with a non-negligible probability and A2 is a factoring algorithm. From
section 4.2 we know that C = gm (mod n). We omit hr for the time being from encryption
function for the sake of convenience. Now we construct the algorithm A2 as follows:
Choose g′
R
←− Zn
Choose z
R
←− Zn
Compute C′ = gz (mod n)
Compute m = A1(n, g′,C′)
Compute d = gcd(z − m, n)
if
√
d ∈ Z then
d =
√
d
end if
if d < 2k then return (d,
n
d
)
end if
It is easy to establish that the distributions of g′,C′ are similar to g, c detailed proofs can
be found from [47].This implies A1 returns the m corresponding to C′ with a non-negligible
advantage.
Further, gz ≡ gm (mod n) so gz ≡ gm (mod p2). As we know ordp2g = p, it gives us
m ≡ z (mod p). Now z ≡ m (mod p) implies z = m which occurs with a negligible probability.
This implies n - z − m giving us a gcd(z − m, n) = γ, where p | γ. But we already known -
γ, implying the d from algorithm A2 may be one among{p, p2, q} breaking the factoring
assumption altogether. Therefore, if A2 is tractable, A1 is easy to achieve making its converse
is also true.
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5.3 Semantic Security
Theorem 5.3.1 The encryption scheme CS presented in chapter 4 is semantically secure under
chosen plain text attack.
The proof for this theorem works in two parts.First we prove that the Okamoto-Uchiyama
cryptosystem [47] is semantically secure chosen plain text attack. Second we extend the proof
to our cryptosystem.
Given only n and g where n = p2q such that p - q − 1 , g ∈ Zn and order of gp−1 (mod p2)
is p, we know that the order of Z∗n = Z
∗
p2q = (p − 1) · (q − 1) · (p). Recall that by Sylow’s
First theorem [23] Z∗n has exactly one p-subgroup, let us indicate this p-subgroup as Ω, where
Ω = {ypq + 1|y ∈ Zp}. Consider some element x , 1 ∈ Z∗n. We can know whether x ∈ Ω by
verifying if order of x ∈ Z∗n divides p or a
p ≡ 1 (mod n). Since p is prime, this is possible only
if |x| = 1, but this contradicts our assumption, so |x| = p.
Definition Let X
R
←− {Ω,Z∗n}. The p-subgroup problem is a decisional problem of given n and
x
R
←− X, deciding whether X = Ω or X = Z∗n \Ω.
Lemma 5.3.2 The Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem is semantically secure ⇐⇒ p-subgroup
problem is intractable.
Proof p-subgroup problem is equivalent to distinguishing between the valid encryptions of
0 and 1.The proof for this equivalence with respect to Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem is
illustrated in [29]. To prove theorem 5.3.2, we need to understand the relationship between Ω
and B. If x ∈ Ω, then xx−1 cannot have order p in Z∗n =⇒ x
x−1 < B. Similarly, if x ∈ B and
x ∈ Γ\1, then xx−1 ∈ B because if xx−1 < B then x(x−1)(p−1) ≡ 1 (mod n) =⇒ p|x − 1 which
contradicts our assumption.
Based on these relations, consider a semantic security algorithm A = (A1, A2) with non-
negligible advantage. Here A1 is used to get m0,m1 and A2 returns whether x
R
←− X belongs to
Ω or Z∗n \Ω. Here we compute g = x
x−1 (mod n). If x ∈ Ω then g < B, giving A2 negligible
advantage over guessing. This results in the probability of B giving x = Ω is negligible.
Similarly if x ∈ Z∗n\Ω, then x ∈ B with overwhelming probability, giving A2, in turn B an
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overwhelming advantage over guessing.By combining these, the overall probability of A2 being
correct is non-negligible.
Proof of theorem 5.3.1 We begin with assumption that Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem is
semantically secure. Suppose there existed an algorithm A′ that accepts some element x
R
←− X,
where X
R
←− {Ω,Z∗n} and public key parameters of Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem (n, g, h).
For breaking CS , A′ needs to guess whether x ∈ Ω or x ∈ Z∗n\Ω.
By theorem 5.3.2 we proved that Okamoto-Uchiyama system is semantically secure if there
is an algorithm that reveals whether x ∈ Ω or x ∈ Z∗n\Ω.Since we assumed Okamoto-Uchiyama
is semantically secure, it implies that no such algorithm exists, which in turn proves that A′
also does not exist.
Chapter 6
Secure Function Evaluation using our
Cryptosystem
This chapter introduces the protocol developed for secure function evaluation based on our
cryptosystem CS = (Gen,Enc,Dec). It is structured by describing the required input for the
protocol and expected outputs once the protocol is finished. Let Alice and Bob be the par-
ticipants involved in this transaction. The communication carried out between Alice and Bob
for successful completion of protocol are indicated in the form of steps. One of the key re-
quirements to keep any Multiparty Computation secure would be to keep the communication
between the involved parties as minimal as possible. The design of our protocol aims for the
same where the transactions between Alice and Bob happen only twice - one forward and one
backward message exchange. Alice sends the encrypted text along with public key parameters
to Bob. Bob homomorphically evaluates the function using the available information and sends
the encryption of the end result back to Alice. The next sections in the chapter discuss about
the correctness of the protocol and the hardness proof. Correctness of the protocol enables us
to understand that even if the entire computation is carried out under encryption, the end re-
sult is the same as if it were carried under plain text settings. Hardness proof on the other hand
deals with the proof that the protocol is difficult to break. The hardness of our protocol depends
on the blinding hiding properties of our evaluation function, so we proceed the discussion by
understanding these properties and developing the proof of hardness based on these properties.
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6.1 Protocol
This protocol specifies how we can apply our CS = (Gen,Enc,Dec) for secure function evalu-
ation in restricted domains. There are many public key approaches for secure function evalua-
tion, however, we are able to make a more efficient approach for this by exploiting the additive
homomorphic properties of CS .
Public: Composite modulus n | n = p2q, generator g ∈ Z∗n, sequence initial value and
step size α, β
Private Keys: p generated by Alice based on the co-domain of g(i) : Z 7→ {0, 1}`
Inputs: Alice- x, Bob- y | x, y ∈ Z2k
Output:Alice and Bob want to evaluate a function g where g is the required linear
embedding function such that, g : Z 7→ 0, 1` on their inputs. Alice will either learn
g(m) | m = x + y or the truth condition of some function where χ(x, y) : Z 7→ Z, which
is in turn evaluated using g : Z 7→ 0, 1`. Bob outputs ⊥
1. Alice encrypts x as cA, β as β′ and sends {c, α, β′, n, g, h} to Bob. Bob encrypts
y with the provided public key.
2. Bob computes χ(x, y) homomorphically tapping the additive and scalar multiplica-
tive properties of the given public key cryptosystems as cB. Or Bob encrypts m as
cB.
3. Now, given rc ∈ Zk, Bob computes c
′
= ((cB)α · β
′
)r
2
c .
4. Alice decrypts c′ using the decryption algorithm. Even after decrypting, Alice will
not recieve the plain text χ(x, y) or m, rather Alice receives some random number
of the form m′ = (α · χ(x, y) + β) · r2c (or m
′ = (αm + β) · r2c )as hidden by r
2
c .
5. Alice computes the Legendre Symbol of m′ giving us 0 or 1 depending on the
plain text value of the function.
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6.1.1 Correctness of the protocol
We wish to prove that the protocol introduced in this section correctly evaluates a function
of the form Z 7→ 0, 1` during the final step. From theorem 4.3.1 we established that Dec(c
′
)
returns g(m). Replace m with χ(x, y) which gives us
Dec(c
′
) = g(χ(x, y)).
6.2 Blinding Hiding Properties of Evaluation Function
The security of our evaluation depends on the blinding hiding properties of evaluation function.
During evaluation we hide our ciphertext using the square of a random element rc
R
←− Z2k . To
establish security, we need to prove that, given the decryption of cipher text hidden by r2c it is
hard to tell whether it belongs to the set of QR or NR. Mathematically, we rely on the decisional
problem of given c′ and the public elements, it is hard to decide whether Dec(c′) = QR or
Dec(c′) = NR, where QR indicates the set of Quadratic residues (mod p) and NR indicates
the set of Non-Residues (mod p). If we can establish that this decisional problem is hard,
then the blinding hiding property of Evaluation function is established.
6.2.1 Hardness Proof
Theorem 6.2.1 Given rc
r
←− Zk, h(x) = αx + β and c
′
, Dec(c
′
) is uniform across the set of
Quadratic Residues (mod p) if h(χ(x, y)) is a Quadratic Residue and Dec(c
′
) is uniform across
the set of Non-Residues (mod p) otherwise.
Proof From the section 3.2 we know f (x) , 0 (mod p). Let us assume that after applying key
generation algorithm from section 4.1 we get p which is of the form 2ki+1 for some odd i. This
implies the prime p consists of two subgroups G2k and Gi with orders 2k and i and generators
gk and gi respectively. Now, for some 0 ≤ y < 2k and 0 ≤ z < i, any element a ∈ Zp will be of
the form
a = gyk · g
z
i (mod p).
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Applying this to Dec(c
′
) we get the following set of equations:
h(χ(x, y)) = gy1k · g
z1
i (mod p).
rc = g
y2
k · g
z2
i (mod p).
This gives us
h(χ(x, y)).r2c = (g
y1
k · g
z1
i ) · (g
y2
k · g
z2
i )
2 (mod p)
= (g(y1+2y2)k · g
(z1+2Z2)
i ) (mod p).
We know since r2c
UR
←−− Z2k , and 2z2
UR
←−− Zi which implies z1 + 2z2
UR
←−− Zi. Similarly, since
2y2
UR
←−− Z2k , y1 + 2y2 is uniformly random in the set of even numbers modulo 2k ⇐⇒ y1
is even and y1 + 2y2 is uniformly random in the set of odd numbers modulo 2k ⇐⇒ y1 is
odd.
Chapter 7
Privacy of the Secure Function Evaluation
Protocol
This chapter will throw a light on the privacy of the secure function evaluation protocol in-
troduced in chapter 6. A private protocol ensures that the computation takes place correctly
while protecting the information of the parties that are involved. We begin with introducing
various adversary models present in a security setting. We then carry out our privacy proofs
under Semi-Honest Adversary setting also known as Honest-But-Curious Model. We then pro-
vide the basic definitions necessary to discuss our privacy proofs. We relied on simulation
based proofs for the privacy of protocols both in Alice and Bob’s perspectives. The last sec-
tion focuses on the privacy proofs for protocol by considering Alice and Bob’s data privacy
separately.
7.1 Adversary Models
Apart from defining the essential components that constitute any Secure Function Evaluation,
it is important to define the settings under which these properties will hold true. There are
many models that exist in literature depending on the honesty level exercised by the adversary.
Defining these honesty levels will change the definitions of the privacy expected under these
settings.There are two main types of adversaries, which are discussed below along with what
are the pre-requisites for privacy under these adversaries.
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Semi-Honest Adversary
This adversary adheres to all the steps specified in the protocol, but looks for any information
that may be leaked in the intermediate steps. These adversaries are assumed to be selfish,
meaning they will take any steps to benefit themselves from the advantageous information
leaked during the intermediary processes.
Malicious Adversary
This adversary is assumed to deviate anytime from the protocol as per their benefit. Deviation
includes many aspects as mentioned in [61] such as proving deceptive values, aborting a
protocol in their own time and taking any action that helps the achieve the desired results.
It is difficult to achieve security against these kind of adversaries. Hence, it can be easily
stated that any system that is secure against malicious adversaries is secure against semi honest
adversaries.
Now, let us assume there are n number of users. Each ith user possesses some xi such that:
xi 7→ Z
In order to calculate a function Fi which in our case Fi : Z 7→ (0, 1)n. Our goal is to construct
a protocol such that each of the user knows F(x1, x2, ..., xn) but none of them knows anything
more about x j for j , i. Based on the privacy for both the adversary models described above
can be defined.
7.2 Basic Definitions
Privacy of the protocol Perfect Privacy under semi honest adversary can be achieved by hid-
ing all the intermediate data and processes to other party. Also known as Honest But Curious
adversary model, privacy under this model assumes that all the n users follow the protocol.
Now, the protocol is k private, if any of the k parties collude with each other learn nothing
more than the outputs.
Privacy under Malicious Adversary Under this setting, the adversary will control k users.
This implies the rest of the n-k users will continue to remain honest. Now the protocol under
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Malicious Adversary will be k private if the adversary does not learn anything from the parties
that they do not control; i.e., the inputs of the n-k users will not be learnt at all. But the
adversary may learn about the outputs of the corrupt parties.
Zero Knowledge Proofs These are protocols by which one party can prove to another party
that it has the knowledge of x without letting the other party know anything about x, other than
the fact that the knowledge of x is true.
View We define a view to work under semi-honest setting. Let χ be a function evaluated by a
protocol π. A view of a party can be defined as the set of elements that can be seen by the party
during the execution of π. Let X, r,Y be inputs,random values and outputs exchanged during
the complete transaction of π. We define views with respect to each parties as :
ViewAlice = (XA, rA,YA).
ViewBob = (XB, rB,YB).
7.3 Privacy Proofs for π
We now prove that π performs secure function evaluation under semi-honest adversary using
a simulation based approach. The key idea behind this simulation is to create a protocol view
of the parties, without the knowledge of any keys. To prove the security of the π, we establish
that the distribution of the resultant protocol view Viewπ and π are indistinguishable. This is
equivalent to the cipher-text indistinguishability of a cryptosystem. Based on section 7.2 the
privacy in a two party setting in the presence of a semi-honest adversary is established if neither
Alice nor Bob do not learn anything other than the intended outputs YB and YA respectively. Our
proofs are divided into two parts: Alice’s privacy, demonstrated by simulating [ViewBob,YA]
and Bob’s privacy demonstrated in the applications where Bob outputs ⊥ and Alice only learns
the truth value, which will be done by simulating [ViewAlice,⊥].
7.3.1 Alice’s Privacy
Theorem 7.3.1 (Alice’s privacy) There exists polynomial time algorithm AB such that it sim-
ulates View∗Bob whose distribution is indistinguishable from that of original view.
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Proof The proof of Alice’s privacy is simple because Bob only receives the cipher-text c =
Enc(x), i.e., YA = c. This implies, the indistinguishability of distribution of ViewAlice is equiv-
alent to the cipher-text indistinguishability of the cryptosystem itself. Since the cryptosystem
is semantically-secure as established in theorem 5.3.1, the ciphertext is also indistinguishable
from any random number. The view of YA can be simulated by simply choosing any random
number rn
R
←− Z∗n. Due to semantic security of the cryptosystem itself, the advantage of an
adversary guessing whether it is rn or YA is negligible.
7.3.2 Bob’s Privacy
Theorem 7.3.2 (Bob’s privacy) There exists polynomial time algorithm AA such that it simu-
lates View∗Alice whose distribution is indistinguishable from that of the original view= [ViewAlice,⊥
].
Proof The privacy of Bob’s output, c′ , relies on the hider rc
R
←− Zk where k is the bit-size of the
prime p. Alice decrypts c
′
and receives m′ = h(χ(x, y))r2c . Now, AA picks some mr
R
←− Zp, as
Alice has access to the private key. Applying f (x) from section 3.2 to mr we get g(mr) which
may be either a Quadratic Residue or a Non-Residue depending on the value of mr. Apply-
ing theorem 6.2.1, we have that Dec(c
′
) is uniformly distributed among the set of Quadratic
Residues and Non-Residues modulo p, which implies it is hard to distinguish between mr and
m
′
.
Chapter 8
Application of our Protocol to Privacy
Preserving Similar Patient Query
This chapter introduces a medical application called Similar Patient Query, which is based
on our CS = { Gen, Enc, Dec}. The increase in the availability of genomic data holds a great
promise for the advancement of personalized medicine. The approach in personalized medicine
relies on understanding how the genetic make up of each person impacts their reaction to
different medications and makes them susceptible to certain diseases. Even though genomic
data is not intrinsically exceptional, there is a belief that it needs to be handled with care
because it has a lot of features that make it extremely useful in a wide range of applications.
The privacy issues associated with genomic data are quite complex due to this very reason. The
problem here is, the breach of genomic data can reveal more information than the information
from which the genome was sequenced. A genomic data can link a whole family tree or
populations together. This will result in information about diseases that a person or an entire
community is susceptible to, garnering unnecessary attention from insurance companies and
scientific research communities. There are numerous researches conducted in the aspect of
genomic data privacy by [63] [62] [39] [15] [44][4]. In fact, [46] conducted a detailed survey on
the issues and concepts related to privacy in the era of genomic data explosion emphasizing the
need for having privacy preserving mechanisms for secure handling, storage and computations
on genomic data. Similar Patient Query (SPQ) is one such privacy preserving application that
involves performing Secure Multiparty Computations on Genomic data. The coming sections
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focus on the basics of SPQ, previous related work in this field, limitations of the existing
approaches, system model, similarity measures, protocol for secure computation of Euclidean
distance and finally, we present a protocol to apply our cryptosystem introduced in the previous
chapters to perform Similar Patient Query and its advantages.
8.1 Similar Patient Query
Imagine there is a doctor that wants to compare an individual patient’s data, let us call it a
query, across a whole database DB that consists of individual genomic sequences that are
labelled with their medical history. Now the doctor wants to find out which of the sequences
in the database are similar to the query sequence. The result is a set of similar patients whose
genomic sequences resemble the query sequence. The doctor can use this information either
to estimate the possible disease onset, reactions to medications, and a wide range of other
medical applications. In short, Similar Patient Query can be defined as a query carried out by
some client/ user over a server which is a database of patients. The SPQ can also be carried
out between two different individuals, the comparison need not be between just a query and
database. This sort of applications are extremely useful in identifying cancer sub types as
they are unique. SPQ will help in recognizing the mutations behind these cancers and also the
related reactions for the treatments offered. That way, the doctor will know in which direction
they can proceed to treat the patient. The similar patient query need not be restricted to medical
setting alone, it an be used for other applications such as exchanging genomic data between
different research groups and private genetic testing companies.
The most popular measures for calculating similarity between two patients’ genomic data
are Euclidean distance, Pearson correlation, and edit distance. There are several privacy im-
plications related sending the patients’ DNA as a query in plain text. Hence, SPQ needs to be
carried out under private settings. Thus most of the literature surrounds around formulating
efficient methods to calculate the similarity measures privately. In our research, we used a spe-
cial technique to calculate Euclidean distance in a privacy preserving manner, which will be
discussed in the coming sections.
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8.1.1 Related Work
Similar Patient Query under privacy preserving settings has been extensively researched in [10]
[3] [67] [58] [38]. The key observation is that all of these studies focus on calculating similarity
between two genomes by taking the overall genomes into consideration. This can adversely
affect the time and computational complexity. The major idea for this application was drawn
from [56], where similarity in genotype data is calculated only by focusing on particular loci
in the chromosomes as opposed to the entire genome. As discussed earlier, alleles present in
this loci have a tremendous impact on patients’ response to a treatment. To establish similarity
in the genotype data many have been conducted to calculate Euclidean distance and Pearson
correlation in privacy preserving manner by [53] [65] [42] [71] [18] [56]. Several other studies
such as [3] [74] [2] [67] computed Edit distance as a similarity measures in privacy preserving
settings. Our protocol only relies on Euclidean Distance as it allows secure computation of
similarity in a much simpler way contrary to the approaches mentioned in the existing studies.
8.1.2 Disadvantages of Existing Approaches
In Similar Patient Query, there are two parties in picture: User who poses the query and a
Database held by the hospital. So privacy for a simple Secure computation can be established
by considering two scenarios : User privacy and database privacy. All the studies discussed in
section 8.1.1 ensure user privacy completely, as it is dependent on the cryptosystem itself. This
topic is discussed in detail in chapter 7 while working out Alice and Bob’s privacy proof’s with
respect to our protocol. Assume here that Alice the user is holding the query and Bob holds
the hospital database. Coming to Bob’s privacy, the existing protocols return similarity scores
once Alice decrypts them. Now, the data held by Bob may not be leaked directly, but there
is a potential risk of inferring the database contents from the similarity scores. Two potential
attacks that can be carried out using similarity scores have been discussed by [60]. These
attacks include Regression attack and illegal query attack.
Under Regression attack, the similarity score between some data point and a target can
be used to identify the contents of a target. As the number of these data points increase, the
probability of identifying the target content will also increase accordingly. For example if
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Bob returns the exact value of Euclidean distance each time Alice sends a query, it can be
eventually narrowed down to finding out what exactly was Bob’s data using multiple attempts.
Hence, it is important to give out as minimum information as possible from Bob’s side to avoid
regression attacks. Similarly, illegal query attack can cause Bob’s response to keep varying
with increasing queries. These variations can again be used to retrieve the target data.
8.2 System Model
Our protocol for SPQ assumes that the two parties involved in the setting are Hospital and
User. Here the Hospital possess the database related to multiple patients’ genome. In practice
there could be any number of hospitals and the entity need not be a hospital at all, it can
be any organization or research institute that can collect and store genomic data. User could
be a doctor or some researcher, who holds a query sequence which has information about: the
location on the genome which they want to compare. Here we are aiming to calculate similarity
between two sets of data. Hospital holds the data about few patients and the user holds data
about some particular patient. The hospital cannot learn about User’s data and vice versa. So
in our current setting, Hospital receives encrypted User’s data which is semantically secure.
User receives only the truth condition of the similarity measure. Please note that sometimes
the terms User and Querier are used interchangeably for this protocol.
The threshold function is similar to the one discussed in section 2.4. Given similarity
measure s and threshold value t, we try to return 0/1 depending on the value of s. The prime
number generation will also be modified according to t because, based on t the domain of
g(i) shall become something like {0, 0, 0, 0, ..., 1, 1, 1, 1}. The protocol is discussed in detail
in section 8.5. Ultimately, we are trying to establish that due to the application of evaluation
function from section 4.3 the application of SPQ is semantically secure against a Honest but
curious user or in a setting of semi-honest adversary.
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8.3 Similarity Measures for SPQ using Genomic Data
Extensive research has been conducted in the area of conducting Similar Patient Queries using
Genomic data in privacy preserving settings by [67] [3] [45]. But these researches concentrate
on finding the similarity between two organisms by comparing the genome as a whole. In real-
ity, the whole genome need not be compared because if we take the case of human genome, 99
percent of the humans are similar. It is the mutations at particular locations on a chromosome
that make the humans different. Each organism consists of a gene, also known as genotype, at
a specific location on their genome called locus. The variations in these loci cause variation in
the physical traits, also known as phenotype, of the organism. These variations are called as al-
lelic variations, where alleles are the variant form of a gene. These alleles represent mutations
at the same locus, which are usually two or more versions. Different populations consist of
different alleles, so we use something called allele frequency to measure the relative frequency
a particular allele at that locus in a given population.
Whole genome sequencing has enabled researchers to identify that there is a relation be-
tween a myriad number of diseases and the genetic variations at a particular locus in an or-
ganism. They are known to affect diseases like diabetes, cancer and other cardio vascular
disorders. Hence, it becomes easier to compare patients using specific variants at a given locus
rather than comparing two whole genomes that contain about 3 billion base pairs. This func-
tionality is useful in various areas such as patient’s response to treatments or onset of a disease
to name a few. For example, the application using Similar Patient Query based on comparing
genotype variants only can typically work on a query like: “What is the reaction of an HIV
patient to the medicine abacavir with a genotype variant HLA-B*5701?” Research has estab-
lished that HIV patients with HLA-B*5701 gene variant indeed have a hypersensitive reaction
to abacavir than those patients that do not possess this gene variant. So it is important to find
out the similarity across the loci where these variants occur.
To calculate similarity, we use Euclidean distance. Let I define the set of all the loci that a
user is interested to compare. x, y are the vectors for which we want to calculate the similarity.
So the Euclidean distance can be represented as:∑
i∈I
(xi − yi)2
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Technically, the actual Euclidean distance is the square root of the value stated above. But we
establish similarity between two patients only if the Euclidean Distance between them is less
than or equal to some predefined threshold value. So, it suffices to square the threshold value
and use it for comparison.
8.4 Protocol for Secure Computation of Euclidean Distance
In this section we describe a protocol for secure computation of Euclidean Distance denoted as
SecED. As we discussed in the previous section, we calculate similarity between two patients
by taking on specific loci on the genomes. For obtaining variant data, we use genomic data
from a file format called as Variant Call Format denoted as VCF. Homozygous allele means
the chromosome has two same copies of the same trait (dominant or recessive) and Heterozy-
gous allele has two different copies. In these files, the genotype variants at specific loci are
primarily of three types : Homozygous Dominant, Homozygous recessive and Heterozygous
alleles which are indicated as 0, 1, 2 respectively. Dominant or recessive alleles indicate the
type of trait. So we convert the data into a new message space : {0, 1, 2}n. n indicates the
number of locations at which the genotype data will be compared.
Since the message space is limited, we pre-build a look-up table that consists of various
combinations of xi, yi from the formula for Euclidean distance. Note that our cryptosystem
only supports Partially Homomorphic Encryption scheme which supports addition and scalar
multiplication. Since Euclidean distance is a sum of squares, we try to pre-calculate all the
possible squares and encrypt them newly for each string, so that hospital only needs to perform
homomorphic addition to calculate similarity. Let ` be the length of user’s query. The look
up table would be as shown in table 8.1. The user encrypts each string separately in order
to maintain the semantic security. And each time the user wants to conduct SPQ, they will
send 3` combinations of data as opposed to ` for each number, so that the hospital will pick
the encryption accordingly to calculate the summation for Euclidean distance. For example,
in case the user wants to send hospital an encryption of {1, 1, 2}, the user will start creating
an array of encryptions for each element in the query string. For the first element in query
string user picks up row related to 1 as shown in fig. 8.1 and encrypts each element from the
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Genotype 0 1 2
0 (0 − 0)2 (0 − 1)2 (0 − 2)2
1 (1 − 0)2 (1 − 1)2 (1 − 2)2
2 (2 − 0)2 (2 − 1)2 (2 − 2)2
Table 8.1: Lookup table
Figure 8.1: Choice of row for string 1
row separately. For the second element in the query string, user chooses the same row and
performs the encryption for the second time. Due to the probabilistic nature of the schemes
used for encryption, we get different encryptions for {(1− 0)2, (1− 1)2, (1− 0)2} each time they
are encrypted. Similar process is applied for the third element 2 in the input sequence string.
Overall 9 encryptions are sent as opposed to 3.
User sends the 9 encryptions by indexing them for the hospital. Let us denote the notations
for an encrypted string as shown in fig. 8.2, double braces indicate the encryption of the string
which is a random number. Let the hospital hold a string {0, 0, 1}, so they will choose from the
received encryptions as shown in fig. 8.3. Once all the encryptions are received the next step is
just to calculate the summation over the relevant encryptions. Since the scheme we are using is
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Figure 8.2: Hospital’s view of encrypted string
Figure 8.3: Encryption chosen by the hospital
additively homomorphic, it is easy to calculate summation of all the bits by simply multiplying
all the encrypted outputs. Once decrypted, this results in a plain text sum as per the properties
of additive homomorphism.
8.5 Private SPQ Protocol
This protocol specifies how we can apply our CS = (Gen,Enc,Dec) for carrying out Simi-
lar Patient Query. Here, hospital and user want to calculate a function to find the similarity
between the patients. The user inputs the query string for which they want to calculate the sim-
ilarity. The query string is drawn from message space {0, 1, 2}n. The user follows the protocol
for secure calculation of Euclidean distance and then carries the complete transaction similar
to the protocol introduced in section 6.1. The complete steps in the protocol along with the
input and expected output are described in fig. 8.4.
8.5.1 Advantage of using Our Approach
Let us assume the case where we do not apply the Evaluation Scheme from section 4.3. This
would imply, hospital will omit step 4 from the Private SPQ protocol and sends the result cal-
culated from step 3. In other words, the user would directly receive the encryption of Euclidean
Distance. As the User applies decryption, they receive: Dec(Enc(ED)) = ED. For each indi-
vidual Query, qi, User receives a corresponding EDi. If User can collect enough EDis, they
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Public: Composite modulus n ∈ Z, generator g ∈ Z∗n
Private Keys:The Boolean co-domain is predetermined based on the threshold value.
User will generate the large prime number p, according to the section 4.1.
Inputs: User’s input is query sequence, Hospital inputs the database. Both
x, y ∈ {0, 1, 2}n
Output: User wants to find out if the query matches with any sequence from DB by
securely evaluating the encrypted Euclidean Distance. Hospital outputs ⊥
1. For each character in a string, user makes use of table 8.1, and sends three encryp-
tions from first row for 0, second row for 1 and third row for 2.The encryption
will carried out separately each time, so that semantic security is ensured. Let us
assume the string sent by the user is cU . So the transaction would involve in the
transfer of {cU , α,Enc(β) = β′, n, g, h} to the Hospital.
2. The hospital picks the suitable encryption depending on the value they are holding
from the column in table 8.1 and forms a new cipher text cH.
3. The hospital computes Enc(ED) =
∑
cH
4. Now, given rc ∈ Z2k , hospital computes c
′
= ((Enc(ED))α · β
′
)r
2
c .
5. User decrypts c′ using the decryption algorithm Dec. Even after decrypting, User
will not recieve the plain text ED, rather Alice receives some random number of
the form (α · (ED) + β) · r2c as hidden by r
2
c .
6. User can find out g(i) depending on the above decrypted value. If the patients are
similar, then g(i) = 0 otherwise it would return 1
Figure 8.4: Private SPQ Protocol
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can easily use the data to extrapolate and find out the accurate data points that hospital owns.
This is where applying evaluation function will eliminate the possibility of carrying out these
type of regression attacks. From the blinding hiding properties of evaluation function, we can
establish that multiplying r2c to the cipher text can actually hide the calculated EDi. The evalu-
ation function will only display the truth value for similarity. To explain it mathematically, let
t be a threshold value used to express the similarity between two patients such that if EDi ≥ t
the patients are similar otherwise they are not similar. So our Evaluation function Eval shall
display a 0 for ED ≤ t and 1 for ED > t.
8.6 Computational Hardness of SPQ protocol
We would like to establish that the protocol described in section 8.5 is difficult to break. The
entire protocol has the following steps:
• Encrypted query from the user, that uses Secure Computation of Euclidean Distance
protocol
• Homomorphic addition by the hospital
• Decryption and Evaluation of Euclidean distance by the user
The hardness of second and third steps from the protocol have already been established. They
are the same as the privacy proofs worked out using simulation technique with respect to Al-
ice and Bob’s view of the protocol in chapter 7. If we are able to establish that the Secure
Computation of Euclidean Distance protocol is hard to break, then it is automatically implied
that the SPQ protocol itself is difficult to break using a polynomial time algorithm. So our
proof for hardness of SPQ protocol is established by proving the hardness of SecED described
in section 8.4. SecED is performed on three plain text elements
R
←− {0, 1, 4}, which are the
final values of the combinations presented in table 8.1. As discussed earlier,the elements are
encrypted freshly every time a transaction takes place. Due to the probabilistic nature of the
cryptosystem, the encryptions generated will be random each time, making it difficult to break
the protocol and ensuring semantic security.
Chapter 9
Implementation
This chapter talks about the implementation of the key generation, or generation of p and the
protocol introduced in chapter 8. For p generation, we used Sage math environment, which
is an open source library based on python. The entire cryptosystem depends on basics from
number theory such as primality testing, CRT and testing for Legendre symbols. All of these
have been constructed as separate functions as described in the algorithms. We analyse the
performance of our cryptosystem by comparing it with the cryptosystem introduced in [20].
For the second part of implementation, we show the application of Similar Patient Query.
One of the crucial aspects with respect to handling computations on genomic data is under-
standing the genomic data set. So, a subsection is dedicated to briefly describing how a ge-
nomic database looks like and how to read its contents. Even though the data set reading in
plain text is done by the individual parties before the transaction is carried out, it is important
that both the parties understand the features associated with it.
9.1 Experiments and Results for p generation
This section discusses about the backbone of our cryptosystem, which is the key generation.
These are dependent on the basics introduced in chapter 3. The first algorithm produces suitable
α, β such that sequences of the form (αi+β) have elements in them, when factorized, the factors
do not repeat. Based on this sequence, we produce p in the second subsection.
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9.1.1 Picking the best α and β
From the theorem 3.2.1 and theorem 3.2.2, we can conclude that in order to develop this new
cryptosystem, we need an efficient algorithm to generate the following: α, β, p. We discuss
two separate algorithms: section 9.1.1 for α, β generation and algorithm 2 for p. The key
idea behind Section 9.1.1 is to find the starting number and step size for a sequence where
maximum number of values contain unique factors as we factorize. While discussing theorem
2, we assumed all the sequence elements would be prime valued. But this algorithm will also
consider a generic case, where the sequence can be prime or composite. For this, a simplistic
approach has been applied, where a random α, β ∈ Z are picked. A sequence will be generated
with α as the beginning value and β as step size. The length of sequence is equal to the length
of the required Linear Embedding Function to be evaluated. Now we traverse through each
element si ∈ Sequence, we pick only those factors that are not squares to decide the Legendre
symbol.
We use a Boolean variable named new factor seen and set it to true as a new factor is noticed
in the list every time. Every time a new element is found, it will be added to the list named
factors. Then a counter is updated to check for the current size of the list. The list will be exited
as soon as the current size will stop changing. Once exited, all the variables are set back to
their default values. This way Algorithm 1 can be implemented for a wide range of α, β ∈ Z.
In order to implement this, the simplest way is to use a nested for loop and iteratively check
across various combinations of α, β and pick the ones that produce the primes of reasonable
bit-size for a given Boolean function that needs to be evaluated.
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Input: Size of the Quadratic Residue Function- i, a,b
Output: For a random length of QRF upto i their respective α, β, bit-size of the prime p
function Searchloop(α, β)
sequence← 0
i← Length(QRF)
for k ∈ {0, i} do
sequence← αi + β
end for
f actors← [ ]
j← 0
for si ∈ sequence do
y← Factorization(si)
currentsize = length( f actors)
lengtho f f actor ← length( f actors)
new f actorseen← False
for f act ∈ y do
if f act , square then
if f act < f actors and new f actor = False then
f actors.append( f act)
j = j + 1
new f actorseen = True
end if
end if
if length( f actors) ≯ currentsize then
Exit
end if
end for
end for
end function
Algorithm 1: Finding α, β
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9.1.2 Key Generation Implementation
Input: For a random length k of QRF upto i their respective k, α, β, required QRF `i
Output: Prime factor p
for i ∈ 1, k do
2: sequence = αi + ·β
end for
4: function systemofcongruences(sequence)
M ← MatrixS pace(GF(2))
6: Prime f actor = f actorize(si)
for si ∈ sequence do
8: Mrows← si
if Prime f actor ∈ si then
10: Mcolumns← 1
end if
12: end forreturn M
end function
14: M′ ← EchelonForm(M)
for row ∈ M′ do
16: check for consistency of the system
if Consistent then
18: return True
end if
20: end for
Algorithm 2: Finding p
9.1. Experiments and Results for p generation 59
B← {}
22: for ai ∈ Prime f actors do
bi ∈ 1, ai − 1
24: if legendre(bi, ai) = `i then return bi
end if
26: B.append(bi)
end for
28: function ComputeP(B, Prime f actors)
p = CRT (B, Prime f actors)
30: A = prod(Prime f actors)
while not prime(p) or p . 1 (mod 4) do
32: p = p+A
end while
34: return p
end function
Algorithm 2 shows a novel method for prime generation, which forms the backbone of the new
cryptosystem we are trying to build. Once the client gives out the Boolean Function domain to
be evaluated, we apply theorem 3.2.1 and theorem 3.2.2 to find the required prime number. In
order for the CRT to work efficiently, we need a consistent system of linear congruences. To test
for consistency, we use the Matrix space and convert them into echelon form. Using matrices
to solve the system of congruences improves the performance of a system with respect to time
and computational complexity, the detailed steps to which are explained in the next section.
Using Matrix Space for the linear system
This section explains how we use a matrix space to test for the consistency of the linear sys-
tem of congruences we are trying to develop using the key generation algorithm developed in
section 4.1.
Inconsistent or Consistent Systems A system of equations is called inconsistent if it has no
solution. A system which has a solution is called consistent.
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si Factors
23 23
27 3 · 3 · 3
31 31
35 5 · 7
39 3 · 13
43 43
47 47
51 3 · 17
55 5 · 11
59 59
Table 9.1: Sequence of elements for α = 4 and β = 23
Once we find a sequence of elements with each of them having at least one unique factor, we
build a matrix where each row represents the sequence number and each column represents
the prime factor. Let us consider a sequence formed with α = 4, β = 23 that consists of 10
elements having at least one unique factor each. We then proceed to following steps:
• Step 1 Generate the sequence of elements and factorize each element to compute all the
unique factors present in the sequence. The sequence with its factorizations is presented
in table 9.1.
• Step 2 The rules for forming a factor base are as follows:
– Even powered factors are omitted out, i.e., for some factor a, {a2, a4, a6, ..} need not
be considered because based on the definitions of Quadratic Residues and Legendre
symbols, they do not affect the Legendre symbol of the sequence element.
– We add every factor to the factor base if it has not appeared previously, so only
unique factors are considered by avoiding repetitions.
– Do not consider a sequence that may consist of 2 in its factor base, as having 2 can
lead to inconsistencies in solving the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
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Based on these rules we obtain the factor base as:
[23, 3, 31, 5, 7, 13, 43, 47, 17, 11, 59].
• Step 3 We convert it into a matrix space in Galois Field, GF(2) such that the matrix
consists of all the elements (mod 2). The rows of the matrix represent the elements of
the sequence and the columns represent prime factors from the factor base list. A 0 or 1
indicates the absence or presence of the factor in the sequence elements respectively. So
the matrix for the sequence elements from table 9.1 and factor base displayed in step 3
looks as follows:
23 3 31 5 7 13 43 47 17 11 59

23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
39 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
43 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
51 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
55 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
As per the algorithm, we append the required function to be evaluated as the last column
in the matrix. For example, we would like to evaluate a threshold function, with t = 0.5
for SPQ whose co-domain would look like:
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].
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In other words, we are looking for a prime p such that
(
23
p
)
= 1(
27
p
)
= 1(
31
p
)
= 1(
35
p
)
= 1(
39
p
)
= 1(
43
p
)
= −1(
47
p
)
= −1(
51
p
)
= −1(
55
p
)
= −1(
59
p
)
= −1.
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So the matrix would be represented as:
A =
23 3 31 5 7 13 43 47 17 11 59 g(i)

23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
39 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
43 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
51 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
55 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
• Step 4 We need to convert matrix A into a row reduced echelon form (RREF) based
on [64] to test for consistency by performing certain elementary row operations. The
requirements for a matrix to be in REF are as follows:
– The first non-zero number entry of the first row should be 1, this is the leading entry
of the row present in the matrix position (1, 1).
– The second row should also have 1 as its leading entry, but this entry should be
further to the right of leading entry in the first row. Similar process is repeated
for every subsequent row, where the first non-zero number in every row is 1 and is
placed further to the right of the leading entry of previous row.
– The leading entry of each row must be the only entry of its column.
– Any non-zero rows are usually placed at the bottom of the matrix.
Keeping these requirements in mind, we try to obtain the matrix in RREF using the
following steps:
– We begin with finding the pivot row, i.e., from the matrix A we identify the first
non-zero entry in the first column of the matrix. This is present in the first row
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itself and the leading element is 1, i.e., the first row itself is pivot row with leading
entry as 1. So we do not need to pivot.
– We repeat pivot for the remaining rows by ignoring the previous ones by continuing
the process until no more pivots are left. For the row where element = 39, where the
row is R5 we perform a operation such that the first entry would be in 5th column.
So we apply row operations and carry on the same procedures for the rest of the
rows.
– We check if all the elements of the rows are zero, except the last column, if that is
the case, then the system is inconsistent. The complete row operations are present
in chapter A.
• Step 5 We check for consistency of the equations in this step. Matrix A in echelon form
would be represented as:
Aechelon =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

If a system is inconsistent, the REF matrix obtained will consist of a row of the form
{0, 0, 0, ...., 1}, i.e., will have a leading 1 in its right most column. Such a row corresponds
to an equation of the form:
0x1 + 0x2 + 0x3 + ... + 0xn = 1.
which definitely has no solution. Since the matrix Aechelon has no such rows, the system
of equations are consistent and certainly have a solution.
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• Step 6 We take the Aechelon matrix and traverse through it row wise and check for each
non-zero row.The leading entry of each of these rows indicate the “deciding factors”. So
the Legendre symbol of the sequence element is decided by the factors represented in
these leading entries. The remaining entries can be categorized as “Unutilized factors”
as they do not impact the overall Legendre symbol of the sequence element. We convert
the last column in these rows to Legendre symbols such that 0 7→ 1 and 1 7→ −1. So the
matrix Aechelon looks as follows now:
Aechelon =
23 3 31 5 7 13 43 47 17 11 59 LS

1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1
5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1
The last element in each row represents the required Legendre symbol for each unique
factor of the sequence. In other words, all the leading entries of each row, the “deciding
factor” of each row is assigned with the Legendre Symbol from the last element of the
row. All the remaining elements called “Unutilized factors” receive Legendre symbol 1.
To explain further, let us examine each row from the Aechelon displayed above. The first
element has one factor 23, the last column has Legendre Symbol 1, this implies 23 needs
symbol 1. Similarly, the next row has only 3 as factor and 3 needs symbol 1. Let LS
denote Legendre symbol, we repeat the same observations across all the rows and we get
the following results:
– The third row has one deciding factor 31, 31 needs LS 1
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– Fourth row has 5 and 11. Now due to row operations, 11 is not deciding factor so,
11 can be assigned LS 1, based on the last column 5 gets −1.
– Fifth row has 7 as leading entry, it receives LS −1. 11 has already been assigned 1.
– Sixth row has 13 as the main factor, which receives 1 as LS based on the last column
value.
– Seventh row has 43 which gets LS −1
– In Eighth row 47 gets −1
– Ninth row has 17 as deciding factor which gets LS −1
– Tenth row has 59 which receives −1
Let us group all the factors into one list called A. This A has all the deciding factors in
the leading entries and unutilized factors are added towards the end of the list. So our A
can be represented as:
{23, 3, 31, 5, 7, 13, 43, 47, 17, 59, 11}.
Applying theorem 3.2.1 from chapter 3, we need to find some list of elements B such
that for some bi ∈ B and some ai ∈ A, for i ∈ row number we have
(
bi
ai
)
≡ LS i.
We computed B =
{8, 1, 19, 3, 5, 12, 26, 23, 12, 39, 1}.
Step 7 This is the final step where we use the B generated and apply theorem 3.2.1 and
theorem 3.2.2 to find p. We first carry on CRT on the list of A, B. Let p′ be some integer
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satisfying the following system of congruences:
p′ ≡ 8 mod 23
≡ 1 mod 3
≡ 19 mod 31
≡ 3 mod 5
≡ 5 mod 7
≡ 12 mod 13
≡ 26 mod 43
≡ 23 mod 47
≡ 12 mod 17
≡ 39 mod 59
≡ 1 mod 11.
Applying the CRT we find p′ = 3693863479318. We use this p′ and add it to a multiple
of the product of all the elements in list A. Let
a =
∏
A′
=
∏
{23, 3, 31, 5, 7, 13, 43, 47, 17, 59, 11}
= 21701118223785.
Finally we search for some prime p of the form
p = ai + p′
= 21701118223785i + 3693863479318
and repeat it until we find some prime p such that p ≡ 1 (mod 4). We find such a value
for i = 27. So the final value of p we obtained for this particular example is:
p = ai + p′
= 21701118223785 · 27 + 3693863479318
= 589624055521513.
Of course if p needs to be larger (e.g. 2048-bits), a larger i can be randomly chosen. For
example setting
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i = 1 017 937 320 413 204 122 451 734 640 586 856 516 712 923 890 121 301 671 467
352 739 768 901 601 034 734 630 832 751 118 559 864 741 589 479 211 939 668 116
999 587 629 431 639 985 506 785 452 222 216 485 698 036 930 569 180 641 349 520
170 764 490 817 745 302 813 311 839 204 222 745 193 307 798 612 603 125 325 657
959 543 903 988 326 984 707 125 038 762 006 839 792 627 761 852 376 498 932 551
558 509 485 925 700 120 315 017 613 219 283 710 374 581 138 546 006 967 575 971
919 007 701 242 921 013 861 469 939 857 529 358 272 079 976 636 646 751 318 293
979 285 823 770 237 152 011 343 977 002 541 605 358 005 041 753 039 635 320 592
260 657 587 613 348 098 464 773 927 971 867 002 193 905 515 488 588 223 518 509
656 791 111 748 877 005 997 426 934 324 370 066 507 793 919 208 324 507 021 187
899 889
yields the 2048-bit prime
22 090 378 134 689 854 668 080 427 282 924 399 061 985 819 057 143 074 636 905
749 502 669 759 243 627 343 109 946 059 649 406 823 888 192 127 133 451 352 131
764 486 660 389 009 911 360 595 055 993 664 603 227 128 050 574 790 768 665 706
293 542 736 860 338 887 946 544 783 444 853 828 040 892 381 096 722 422 382 282
208 703 853 107 887 071 741 270 179 612 861 146 502 611 233 027 524 669 896 250
225 919 308 714 002 851 453 195 821 246 252 248 594 014 614 336 885 721 706 509
818 061 443 476 514 009 134 473 905 290 198 283 343 891 119 346 531 846 306 946
446 935 635 519 599 396 204 634 046 380 053 571 297 272 810 718 798 253 473 115
268 635 805 443 863 703 912 782 069 180 419 966 100 459 558 431 826 475 599 268
846 253 100 958 565 217 359 310 385 285 591 586 732 639 093 868 978 919 193 526
919 403 603 942 139 183.
Finally we can check that p implements the intended function. Recall α = 4, β = 23 and
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the arithmetic sequence generated by it (see table 9.1). We confirm that indeed:
(
23
p
)
= 1(
27
p
)
= 1(
31
p
)
= 1(
35
p
)
= 1(
39
p
)
= 1(
43
p
)
= −1(
47
p
)
= −1(
51
p
)
= −1(
55
p
)
= −1(
59
p
)
= −1.
9.2 Analysis of Results
We generated prime p for various sequence sizes. These sequence sizes are equal to the co-
domain size of the functions to be evaluated. We carry out the comparison of our results
with [20] and analyze out results accordingly. The maximum bit-size achieved for the d-
approximation of threshold functions in [20] was 26. The table 9.2 gives us time values through
important steps while implementing algorithm 2 for a function of sequence size 512.
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Function size (domain cardinality) 512 256 100 50
Converting Congruences to Matrix Space 0.568 0.1756 0.202 0.0675
Test for consistency 1.842 0.653 0.205 0.0401
Finding bi 0.1306 0.034 0.2347 0.078
CRT 130 20 0.9853 0.0653
Table 9.2: Run time for various steps in the the key generation in seconds
For evaluating a 512-element (29-bit) function, we need a sequence with at least 512 number
of elements having unique factors. The α, β of the sequence will be chosen from the pre-
calculated values generated from running section 9.1.1 giving us the value of α = 1938, β = 31.
These values may vary each time we run the algorithm. The same applies for the rest of the
results as well. As we can observe from the results of various sequence sizes, the maximum
time among all the steps is taken by the implementation of Chinese Remainder Theorem. CRT
is an exponential time algorithm that has time complexity of O(S 1 + S 2)2, where si denotes the
number of digits in the modulus we are trying to solve, which is a product of all the moduli
present in the system of congruences. So the larger the number of congruences to be solved,
the greater is its time and computational complexity. Similarly, we produced results for various
sequence sizes and the time taken through various steps of implementation can be observed in
the following plot. Note that the largest sequence of 512 took under 2 minutes to calculate. The
search based approach introduced in [20] takes more than 20 minutes to produce a sequence of
size 26.
Performance Indicator Residue HE introduced in [20] Our Protocol
Highest sequence size 26 512
Evaluation Function Domain {0, 0, 0, .., 1, 1, 1} Any function of the form {0, 1}`
Finding prime for sequence of 20 > 20 minutes 0.003 seconds
Table 9.3: Comparison between protocol introduced in [20] and CS
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Figure 9.1: Run Time for various steps in p generation algorithm
9.3 Performance Evaluation of SPQ
This section describes the implementation process of SPQ. It is divided into two sections- the
first sections contains the description of genomic data and the second section discusses the
actual implementation of the SPQ protocol. The implementation was carried out in Python 3.7
environment. In the given time frame we were able to carry out the implementation only using
Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem. Nonetheless, the implementation using Paillier cryptosys-
tem is likely to yield the same results.
9.3.1 Data set Description and Reading Genomic Data
The data set we used for the development of SPQ application was derived from the human
genome project. All the data were de-identified by removing the information related to the
humans that carry the genome, just leaving the information on the locus of the gene and the
genotype present at the locus. The data is present in Variant Call Format, a file format specifi-
cally used to store information about a particular position on genome. Dealing with VCF files
is difficult, so we try to extract the data from these files into readable format by converting
it to either an Excel or csv. The sample data we deal with looks something like shown in
fig. 9.2 after transformation. The first two columns are patient related information, which are
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Figure 9.2: Head shot of HG00096 genotype data
de-identified. Chromosome and Position locate to the exact position of the genotype. RSID is
a unique ID given to Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms, the ref column indicates the reference
gene at the location and Alt is the alternative polymorphism that could be found at the location,
genotype column refers to the actual genotype found in the individual. As discussed in the
chapter 8, the value 0 for the column named “Genotype” indicates a homozygous dominant
genotype. So if we take the first row from fig. 9.2, the genotype at the given location would be
AA. Similarly, 1 indicates a heterozygous genotype, meaning at the given locus we could find
AG genotype. Finally the value 2 for the genotype column indicates a homozygous recessive
genotype, meaning two copies of alternate alleles can be found in this case we may find the
genotype GG. These numbers were assigned based on a library named “Scikit-Allele” [40]
from python, so the notations may vary depending on the library/programming language used.
9.3.2 SPQ Implementation
To implement the SPQ protocol, we integrated all the functionalities developed from the pre-
vious algorithms. The SPQ protocol’s output will be evaluated such that, let T be the threshold
value,
f (ED) =

0 if ED ≤ T
1 if ED > T.
Depending on the threshold value and the size of the sequence we implement the key generation
algorithm. For example, if the threshold value is 30, then ED ≤ 30 implies that patients are
similar. Let the length of the sequence be 100, then we generate a binary sequence of the form
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:
[0] ∗ 30 + [1] ∗ 70.
We use section 4.1 and algorithm 2 to generate p, which will be the secret key of Okamoto-
Uchiyama cryptosystem. At first the encryption function will be applied directly by the querier
by importing the cryptosystem. Here all the public and private keys are generated before even
running the application. The crucial step in SPQ protocol is implementation of protocol for
secure computation of Euclidean distance. For implementing this, we relied on pandas data
frames in python. The querier’s input will be read iteratively across the entire string and
three encryptions for each string are generated in each iteration. This is sent to the hospital,
which then performs addition homomorphically. Then we multiply it with alpha and add β
homomorphically. The entire result is raised to a random r2c | rc
R
←− Z2k , which is homomorphic
multiplication that can be evaluated upon decryption.
The protocol implementation has three algorithms:
• section 9.3.2 is the algorithm for User encryption for implementing the protocol for se-
cure computation of Euclidean distance
• In the algorithm presented in section 9.3.2, Hospital chooses the relevant cipher text
based on the indices and performs homomorphic addition, converting the cipher text c to
αc + β and then re-randomizing it by multiplying with r2c .
• The algorithm displayed in section 9.3.2 consists of User Decryption and applying eval-
uation function to find if Euclidean distance is ≤ threshold value.
User SPQ
In this step the user will contain a plain text query ∈ {0, 1, 2}n. The user will input the query
into algorithm in section 9.3.2. The algorithm will scan across each value in the user’s query
and will encrypt the related bit from table 8.1 , that way for each bit 3 different encryptions are
produced based on the table 8.1. All of these are stored in an array named res. Now the user
sends this res array, along with files containing the public key modulus n, g values the hospital
in separate files as comma separated values.
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Input: Pre-computed Euclidean Distance Values in Plain text, input query sequence,pk,
OkamotoUchiyama.enc
Output: For each bit in query sequence, encrypted Euclidean distance combinations- Encr
Lookup← [[0, 1, 4], [1, 0, 1], [4, 1, 0]]
function spqencrypt(query, pk)
c← OkamotoUchiyama.enc(pk, query) return c
end function
function spquser(query)
for n ∈ query do
d f ← int(n)
end for
res← [[ ]]
for i ∈ d f do
for x ∈ Lookup[i] do
data← spqencrypt(x, pk)
res.append(data)
end for
end for
return res
end function
Algorithm 3: User SPQ
Hospital SPQ
Presented in section 9.3.2, this algorithm the hospital receives three files related to res, n, g and
the RS ID of particular gene locations. Using these files the hospital will now calculate the
Euclidean distance as per the Secure ED protocol. In the first step, the hospital will form an
empty array to store the Encrypted Euclidean Distance values denoted as EED in section 9.3.2.
Now we read across each file in the database held by the hospital. In every single patient file,
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we compile the necessary sequence based on the RS IDs and these sequences will be used for
comparison. For each patient, we pick one sequence. In the beginning of search through every
patient’s sequence we form an empty array titled arr. Now we iterate through every single
sequence and using the sequence value and the iteration step, we form the column and row re-
spectively of the encrypted results. For example if we are in second row and the sequence value
with hospital is 2, we pick the value at location res[2][2] in res array. That way for each se-
quence, we form a complete array filled with differences of squares. Now we homomorphically
sum this array for obtaining the Euclidean distance by taking the prod value of entire array. We
take the encrypted sum for each individual record and blind it by homomorphically multiplying
α and adding β. To do this, we raise the EncryptedSum to plain text α (mod n) using the pow
function in python. This is the fastest implementation of exponentiation (mod n). Where as,
to homomorphically add β, we need to encrypt β first and then perform multiplication of cipher
texts. We then re-randomizing using some r2, where r ∈ Zn. This way, EEDs of all the patients
are sent back to the user.
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Input: RSIDs, res - the Encrypted Euclidean distance combinations that were outputted from
section 9.3.2, n, g, α, β, OkamotoUchiyama.enc, hospital database
Output: Encrypted Euclidean Distance
Encr ← res
function spqhosp(hospdata)
EED← [ ]
for seq ∈ hospdata do
df ← [int(i) for i ∈ seq]
arr ← [[ ]]
for j ∈ len(df ) do
data← encr[ j][d f [ j]]
arr.append(data)
end for
pk ← n, g
EncryptedSum← math.prod(arr)
ct = (EncryptedSum)(α) · (enc(β)) (mod n)
r
R
←− {1, 2, 3, ...., n}
c′ ← ctr
2
(mod n)
EED.append(c′)
end for
return EED
end function
Algorithm 4: Hospital SPQ
User Decryption and Evaluation
As presented in section 9.3.2 this is the final step in the protocol where the user receives a file
full of re-randomized Encrypted Euclidean Distance values that were calculated between the
user query and all the patients in the hospital database. User applies Dec and retrieves the plain
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text message that is of the form m′ = ((αED + β) · r2). Now the user applies kronecker symbol
to m′, which returns the Legendre symbol of m′ based on the threshold value of Euclidean
Distance.
Input: c′ from section 9.3.2, sk, g, OkamotoUchiyama.dec()
Output: Similarity of patient
ct ← c′
function spqdec(ct,sk,g)
pt ← OkamotoUchiyama.dec(sk, g, ct)
return pt
end function
function Eval(pt,p)
result ← kronecker(pt, p)
if result == 0 then
return “Patients are Similar”
else
return “Check for next patient”
end if
end function
Algorithm 5: User Decryption and Evaluation
9.4 SPQ Results Analysis
Upon implementing the three algorithms described in the previous section, we obtained the
results pertaining to the time taken to implement various protocols with respect to different
threshold values. Also, we included the accuracy scores and precision scores by comparing
the results from Secure Function Evaluation with Plain Text calculations. We conducted SPQ
across various database sizes ranging from 60,000 records to a few 100 records. The results
are displayed fro 60,000, 1000 and 100 records.
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Protocol Name 60,000 records 1000 records 100 records
User SPQ 5.45 5.45 5.45
Hospital SPQ 530 0.653 0.205
User Decryption and Evaluation 0.1306 0.034 0.02347
Table 9.4: Results for various steps in the SPQ protocol in seconds
User SPQ takes the same time in all three cases as the input query remains the same irre-
spective of the number of records we are trying to compare. For implementation, we considered
genotype sequences of the size 10, i.e., the query and the hospital database belongs to message
space M
R
←− {0, 1, 2}10. Amongst all the steps, Hospital SPQ happens to be the critical as
the Euclidean distance has to be calculated homomorphically across every single record. The
bigger the size of hospital database, the longer will be time consumed in this aspect. User
decryption and Evaluation process take the least amount of time. The reason is that decryption
is implemented using Extended Euclidean Algorithm and evaluation just carries out symbol
verification.
To test for the efficiency of our matching algorithm, we want to compare it with a Bloom
Filter implementation of Similarity Matching using Euclidean Distance. Bloom Filter Encod-
ings are approximate matching methods introduced by [59] that employ Bloom Filter Data
Structures. They are `-bit vectors with k secret hash functions. An element e ∈ {0, 1}n is in-
serted into the filter by pointing to the outputs of the secret hash-functions. We used precision
scores in similarity matching for carrying out the comparison. We changed threshold values
for Euclidean Distance Comparison each time and carried on the Similar Patient Query. Pre-
cision Scores are in the scale of 0-1 and high precision scores indicate that the false positive
rate is very low. To proceed further with Bloom Filters, we need a special protocol to compute
Euclidean Distance which is described in the next section.
Protocol for Euclidean Distance Computations with Bloom Filters
This segment sketches a secure protocol to compute Euclidean Distance using Bloom filters.
Bloom filters are ultimately a data structure for set membership testing, and thus can only
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be applied toward calculating Euclidean distance with some modification. Recall that, when
using Genotype data we are dealing with the character/message space of {0, 1, 2}n. So we
cannot directly apply Euclidean distance computations in the conventional sense as there will
be repetitions of these limited characters across the bloom filters, resulting in poor similarity
matching rates and accuracy scores. To avoid this, we propose a special protocol where instead
of comparing the characters in the sequence, we compare the RSID by forming a bloom filter
based on the genotype character. Recall that before forming the genotype sequences, the user
publicly declares the RSID positions that they want to compare. We gather all these RSID
numbers and pick the related genotype. For this protocol, we pick the RSID numbers instead.
The following are the detailed steps to carry on the protocol:
• We form 3 Bloom Filters based on the three genotype characters and label them as BF0,
BF1 and BF2.
• We take each RSID and insert it into the Bloom filter corresponding to the genotype at
that location. For example rs587697622 has a genotype 0, we apply BF0 to it. We repeat
the same process across all RSID positions.
• Consider two genotype sequences, S eq1 and S eq2, each with three associated Bloom fil-
ters BF0, BF1, BF2. Initialize a counter b ← 0. We can (approximately) compute their
Euclidean distance between S eq1 and S eq2 as follows:
– Compare BF0 of S eq1 with BF1 of S eq2. For every for each bit position containing
a 1 in both Bloom filters, increment b by 1.
– Compare BF0 of S eq1 with BF2 of S eq2. For every for each bit position containing
a 1 in both Bloom filters, increment b by 4.
– Compare BF1 of S eq1 with BF2 of S eq2. For every for each bit position containing
a 1 in both Bloom filters, increment b by 1.
– Compare BF1 of S eq1 with BF0 of S eq2. For every for each bit position containing
a 1 in both Bloom filters, increment b by 4.
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– Compare BF2 of S eq1 with BF0 of S eq2. For every for each bit position containing
a 1 in both Bloom filters, increment b by 1.
– Compare BF1 of S eq1 with BF2 of S eq2. For every for each bit position containing
a 1 in both Bloom filters, increment b by 4.
• If b < t for threshold 0 < t, output ‘match.’ Otherwise output ‘non-match’.
Matching Accuracy Comparison Experiment
Implementing and analyzing the heuristic security of a novel Bloom filter construction is out-
side of the scope of this thesis, which we will leave to future work. In this interest of a more
direct-comparison between our system and Bloom filter constructions previously established
in literature, instead of a Euclidean distance measure of sequence similarity/dissimilarity, we
return to the set-similarity approach of [20], and compare the matching accuracy of our scheme
against a Bloom filter approach based on the Dice coefficient.
Without loss of generality, consider an ` = 1000 bit bloom filter, with k = 20 hash func-
tions. For 1 ≤ k ≤ 20 let hk : {0, 1}∗ → {0, . . . , ` − 1} be a set of hash functions. Consider
a genotype sequence of n-characters. Since the genotype alphabet consists of three characters
{0, 1, 2}, if we use bi-grams for hashing, the set of all possible bi-grams has a cardinality of
only 9, meaning two random genotype strings of a relatively short length would be likely to
share all bigrams in common (and therefore look like identical strings in a Bloom filter), even
if the two strings are trivially quite quite dissimilar by any other reasonable metric.
Our approach, therefore, is to use a larger window size. We chose to use 6-gram sequences,
because the set cardinality to 36 = 729 is comparable to the standard use in literature involving
bi-grams of alphabetic characters (i.e., 262 = 676). Additionally we used padding charac-
ters. For example, the genotype sequence ‘2222222222’ has one nominal 6-gram (’222222’).
However with padding, the 6-gram set would look like: [‘ 2’, ‘ 22’, ‘ 222’, ‘ 2222’,
‘ 22222’, ‘222222’, ‘222222’, ‘222222’, ‘222222’, ‘222222’,‘22222 ’, ‘2222 ’, ‘222 ’,
‘22 ’, ‘2 ’], where the ” ” indicates a padding character. We denote a 6-grams as s6g
Next, we define the following experiment:
• Step 1 For a given genotype sequence s, declare a bloom filter b f of 1000 bits with 0s.
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So b f = {0, 0, 0, ..., 0, 0}.
• Step 2 Decompose the genotype sequence s into a set of 6-grams, S .
• Step 3 For each 6-gram s6g ∈ S , insert into the Bloom filter as follows. For each 1 ≤ k ≤
20 hash function hk, compute j = (hk(s6g)) (mod 1000). Set b f [ j] = 1.
• Step 4 Repeat steps 1 − 3 to construct a bloom filter for all the genotypes sequences in
the hospital database.
• Step 5 Given a query bloom filter , compute the Dice coefficient between the query and
each record in the database. The Dice coefficient between two sets a, b is computed as:
Dice(a, b) =
2 · (a ∩ b)
|a| + |b|
where |a| indicates the cardinality of set a.
• Step 6 For threshold t, query sequence query and a single sequence from hospital database
record, If Dice(query, record) ≥ t, return 1. Other wise 0.
• Step 7 For obtaining the truth, we take the 6-grams from plain text data and compute the
Dice coefficient between plain-text query and plain-text records.
• Step 8 We repeat steps 1−7 for rest of the records in the hospital data base. We collect all
the results using Bloom Filters and the plain-text data and compute the precision scores.
• Step 8 We need precision scores because we want to evaluate how the false positive rate
(n.b., P[False Negatives = 0] with Bloom filters) is behaving with respect to Bloom
filters. For a given query, if the ground truth returns a record as a match and the Bloom
Filter also shows it as a match, then it is a True match. In case the ground truth returns
that the query is not a match to the record but the Bloom Filters returns this as a match,
then we see that record as a false match. It is essential to eliminate false positives,
because we would not want the wrong patient data to be returned as a match as it can
have adverse impact with respect to medical information. We compute the precision
scores using the following formula:
Precision =
True Matches
TotalMatches
=
True Matches
True Matches + False Matches
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The value of precision scores range from 0 − 1, a score 1 indicates there are no false
positives.
We carried out the comparison of these similarity results with our SPQ protocol. Our protocol
outperformed Bloom Filters in this aspect with precision scores equal to 1 for threshold values
ranging from 0.50 − 0.90 as displayed in all the results below. This comparison was imple-
mented across 100 records in the hospital database. The precision scores for our SPQ protocol
were also calculated based on the Euclidean Distance scores measured on the plain-text data
set. Where as for Bloom Filters protocol, we calculated the precision scores by comparing
the dice coefficient values on the plain text data. Finally, we took the average of the precision
scores from 100 different runs of the SPQ protocol in Bloom Filters and our protocol. i.e., We
queried 100 different patients data across a database of 100 records. In different implementa-
tions, we varied the query size and the hospital database accordingly. So for example, when
we had to use a query of sequence size 20, we used the database related to sequence size of 20
and vice versa.
The experiments were conducted across different genotype sequence sizes of 10, 12, 15, 20,
25. The graphs are presented in fig. 9.3 indicate that our protocol implements ideal function-
ality. The precision score of 1 means there are no false positives or false negatives and the
transaction carried out to calculate Euclidean Distance is exactly the same the one carried out
under plain text. Note that to generate the prime numbers, the maximum sequence size need
to be disclosed. For example, in the 10-character sequence, the maximum Euclidean Distance
would be ED(2222222222, 0000000000), which is equal to 40, where ED(A, B) =
∑
(a − b)2
for a ∈ A, b ∈ B. So the prime number generated needs to have the linear embedding in the
size of g(i)
R
←− {0, 1}40. Based on the threshold value, we decide on the co-domain order within
this size of 40. So each time we change the threshold value, we had to generate a new prime
depending on the Legendre Symbol sequences.
Coming to bloom filters, we used the same threshold values as that of our protocol for
dice-coefficient calculations. Since the scope of this thesis is limited to our protocol alone, the
parameters from Bloom Filters were chosen based on the industrial standards. Accordingly,
we applied two different bloom filters:
9.4. SPQ Results Analysis 83
1. Bloom Filter of 1000 bits with 20 hash functions
2. Bloom Filter of 2000 bits with 30 hash functions
The results for all the 100 experiments are displayed in the figure shown in fig. 9.3. These
results indicate that the Bloom Filters showed improved performance only with increased bit
sizes and increased number of hash function. Even though Bloom Filter Encodings are known
for their speed in search algorithms, they have a problem of returning large number of false
positives. The precision scores improve in the bloom filters only when the threshold values
keep increasing. However, one should observe that, in case of threshold function at 50% the
in both classes, i.e., above or below threshold has similar distribution. As it keeps increasing
there is skewed distribution. So the change in precision do not reflect the improvement in
performance of bloom filter rather they reflect the fact that the number of hits are easier to
capture for precision at skewed distribution of data. Whereas, our protocol implements ideal
functionality across all sequence sizes and entire range of the threshold values.
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(a) Results for SPQ on genomic sequence size 10
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(b) Results for SPQ on Genomic sequence size 12
50 60 70 80 90
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Match Threshold
Pr
ec
is
io
n
Sc
or
e
BF-1000
BF-2000
Our SPQ Protocol
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(d) Results for SPQ on Genomic sequence size 18
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(e) Results for SPQ on genomic sequence size 20
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(f) Results for SPQ on genomic sequence size 25
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Figure 9.3: Results across experiments on various genotype sequence sizes
Chapter 10
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter summarizes our thesis and throws a light on the contributions that can be used in
this field. It also examines the limitations of our current research work by highlighting certain
complexities that exist in the implementation of the cryptosystem. This way, the potential
areas for future work can be identified to optimize this cryptosystem further. We stated that the
cryptosystem can be used for private function evaluation for the functions of the form Z 7→ B
and we implemented it on threshold functions. There are still undiscovered functions of this
type to which our cryptosystem can be efficiently extended. We split this chapter into three
sections:
• Section 10.1 summarizes the thesis by briefly restating the key aspects of the research
including the application.
• Section 10.2 presents the contributions of our cryptosystem, and highlights the limita-
tions that we faced through the implementation process.
• Section 10.3 highlights the prospects of our cryptosystem and other applications that it
can possibly extended to. It also highlights the areas where more work needs to be done
to improve the time and computational complexity.
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10.1 Summary
This thesis discussed the importance of secure computations and the related work that is car-
ried out in this area. We briefly examined two probabilistic cryptosystems that exhibit additive
homomorphism. Their description was done by examining the three components of any cryp-
tosystem namely:
• Key Generation algorithm- Gen
• Encryption - Enc
• Decryption -Dec
We extended these additive homomorphisms to perform secure or private function evaluation
in a unique way by introducing a new Key Generation algorithm Gen. Precisely, this Gen
presents a unique way of generating prime p, which forms the secret key as it is one of the
factors of n for n = pq. To develop this key generation algorithms, we introduced new form
of functions called functional embeddings and extended this concept of functional embeddings
to Linear embeddings in Residue Symbol sequences. Based on the properties of such linear
embeddings in Quadratic residues and non-residues (mod p), we developed two new theo-
rems along with proofs. The first theorem emphasized the possibility of discovering pattern
of linear embeddings in some modulus and the second theorem discusses on the possibility of
such modulus being a prime number. Using this key generation, we introduced a fourth com-
ponent into the cryptosystem called an evaluation function, indicated as Eval that helps us to
perform secure or private function evaluation in a unique way upon decryption. We then dis-
cussed the security of our cryptosystem by explaining the necessary jargon surrounding these
concepts. We ran through necessary theorems and proofs that help us establish the hardness of
the developed cryptosystem.
We developed a new protocol based on the developed cryptosystem with four steps namely
Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval. The correctness and hardness proof of this protocol were also described
along with it. Then we discussed the privacy of the participants involved in the protocol. Since
we developed two party computation, the privacy is discussed for both of these parties sep-
arately by introducing the concept of view and developing a simulation based privacy proof.
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Then we extended this cryptosystem to an application known as Similar Patient Query. We
discussed the basics of SPQ, the related work done in this field, and a brief description of the
similarity measures used in genomic data. We developed a new protocol for secure computation
of Euclidean distance and used it in the development of SPQ . We highlighted the advantages
of our protocol over the existing systems and also developed a hardness proof alongside with
it. The final chapter threw light on the implementation of the cryptosystem and the application.
We presented the algorithms required for finding α, β required for the generation of prime p
and key generation algorithm itself. We presented the analysis of results in comparison with
previous work in [20]. Implementation of SPQ is also presented by describing the details of
genomic databases, implementing user-spq, hospital-spq, user-decryption and evaluation. We
carried out analysis of results by comparing our protocol to similarity matching using Bloom
Filter Encodings. We also introduced a new methodology to compute accurate Euclidean dis-
tance among genomic data bases using Bloom Filter Encodings. We finally presented the
precision scores for both the protocols.
10.2 Contributions and Scope for Future Work
The main contributions of our thesis are development of a unique way for secure function eval-
uation using the properties from number theory and SPQ application using Euclidean Distance.
We modified the existing probabilistic cryptosystems that display additive homomorphisms in
a way to be able to implement private function evaluation using the possibility of finding arbi-
trary patterns in the runs of Quadratic and Non-Quadratic Residues modulo p. Even though this
property has been described in previous work by [20], the paper used a search based approach.
In search based approach, the prime number with the required Residue and Non-residue se-
quences is iteratively searched. Due to this, the application was limited to threshold function
alone and also the implementation was time consuming. So, we optimized it by generating the
required prime number instead. While cutting down the time required for finding such primes
drastically, we were also able to extend to the functionality to any kind of domain that has a
message space of {0, 1}n where n is the size of the required co-domain.
The prime generation requires finding out sequences that have elements consisting of unique
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factors when factorized. In other words, if we want a function for size of 29 bits, i.e., 512 char-
acters in the co-domain, we need to find a sequence that has 512 elements with each element
consisting at-least one unique factor so we can manipulate its Legendre symbol. To find the
start of such sequence and its relevant step size, we iteratively generate multiple sequences,
factorize each element in this sequence and iterate it until a unique factor is no longer found.
More work can be conducted in this area to develop more optimized algorithms for generation
of such sequences. This can also be extended to find primes of smaller bit lengths. With respect
to practical use for this cryptosystem, we discussed only SPQ application. We believe that the
versatility of this secure function evaluation has not been fully realised. Future researches can
be conducted in this aspect to find out applications for any functions with a co-domain space
of {0, 1}n.
10.3 Conclusion
The increase in the availability and accessibility of personal information is demanding more
sophisticated ways of processing that information while ensuring privacy. The research in the
area of Secure Computations is never ending owing to the increase in applications involving
encrypted data. There is always a scope for improvement in devising Secure and Private Func-
tion Evaluation algorithms that offer lower computational and time complexities. While our
protocol offered a solution to carry out function evaluation for Linearly embedded domains,
continued research in this aspect may improve the scope for evaluating more complex func-
tions using simpler homomorphic encryption schemes and other cryptographic algorithms.
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Appendix A
Row Operations for Matrix A
This appendix presents row operations that were carried on to convert Matrix A from sec-
tion 9.1.2 into row echelon form.
Row Operation 1
Add −1 times the second row to the fifth row:

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

r5+(−1)r2
−−−−−−→

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

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Row Operation 2
Add −1 times the second row to the eighth row:

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

r8+(−1)r2
−−−−−−→

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

Row Operation 3
Add −1 times the fourth row to the ninth row:

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

r9+(−1)r4
−−−−−−→

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

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Row Operation 4
Interchange the fifth and ninth row

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

r5↔r9
−−−−→

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

Row Operation 5
Multiply 5th row by −1

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

(−1)×r5
−−−−−→

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

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Row Operation 6
Interchange 6th row and 9th row

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

r6↔r9
−−−−→

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

Row Operation 7
Interchange 7th row and 9th row

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

r7↔r9
−−−−→

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

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Row Operation 8
Interchange 8th row and 9th row
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

r8↔r9
−−−−→

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

Row Operation 9
Add (-1) times the 5th row to the 4th row
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

r4+(−1)r5
−−−−−−→

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

The matrix on the right hand side of row operation 9 represents the final matrix in Row-
Reduced Echelon form. Remember, we are doing all the matrix operations in a Galois Field 2,
so in the final matrix presented in chapter 9, all the values are converted into (mod 2). So the
rows with elements −1 will be converted into 1.
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